Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Abstract

Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long versus short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post‐reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. (JEL C92, H41, D23)

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

“…To the best of our knowledge, it has not yet been studied how players vote when the choice is between a standard public goods game and a game with an exclusion option. In the experiment by Solda and Villeval (2018), the exclusion institution itself is exogenously imposed but players can vote to decide who will be excluded and for how long. They find that free-riders, and in particular those who deviate considerably and repeatedly from the group average, are excluded more often and for a longer period than others.…”

Do Sanctions or Moral Costs Prevent the Formation of Cartel-Type Agreements?

“…However, evidence on the effect of exclusion with reintegrationwhich resembles our implementationhas been collected in other games. For instance, Soldà and Villeval (2020) find in a taking game that a long exclusion has a high disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Concerning the treatment with exclusion, previous experiment using exclusion over one period and find that the presence of exclusion favors the choice of cooperative behavior (Masclet 2003, Kerr et al 2009, Koike et al 2018.…”

Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment

“…In the endogenous treatment, a randomly chosen group member decides about the temporary agent's membership extension or replacement after a certain time. Previous research [29,42] shows that the decision-maker will be influenced by the group's behavior, i.e., the cooperation level in the group, in the first part before deciding on membership extension or replacement. The decision-maker may, then, signal her (dis)satisfaction with group behavior.…”