Teaching philosophy of science that matters

Abstract

close colleagues, it becomes hard to conceive of plausible scenarios in which philosophical research will produce anything of value for science or society. Yet, Kitcher argues, that is what we can and should expect from philosophy -especially in times like ours. Academic philosophy should reform and recalibrate itself to the values and needs of science and society. In Dewey's memorable words, philosophy can and should aspire to more than being "a sentimental indulgence for a few" (Dewey, 1916; cited in Kitcher, 2023, p.4).Kitcher's diagnosis of the sorry state of Anglophone philosophy does not apply equally to all its subfields. As he himself points out, philosophy of science appears to be in a relatively healthy state. We think that this rings particularly true for the area of practice-oriented philosophy of science, or philosophy of science in practice (PSP), which has grown into a vibrant and fruitful approach to studying the sciences (Ankeny et al., 2011). More than anything, it has reduced the distance between philosophy of science and the practice of science, and between philosophers and scientists. What used to be the exception is nowadays common: philosophers collaborating closely with scientists, publishing in science journals, and contributing actively to (meta)scientific discussions. Moreover, many of the same philosophers of science are starting to contribute to more 'broadly engaged', socially relevant philosophy of science endeavors. Until recently, it would have been unthinkable to encounter conference sessions on how to engage with stakeholders from NGOs or government agencies as a philosopher of science. It is no longer. And so, we believe that practice-based and socially relevant philosophy of science may be showing the way forward for other areas of philosophy.But what about teaching? One would expect that the avant-garde role of philosophy of science in bringing philosophical research closer to science and society has left its marks on teaching too. However, a look at some of the most popular textbooks in philosophy of science today shows this not to be the case. With some notable exceptions, philosophy of science textbooks still tend to focus on the 'core topics' that we inherited from the twentieth century. Treatments of empiricism, methodology, rationality, frameworks, revolutions, explanation, realism, and the like dominate their pages, often only leaving room for a brief discussion of 'current issues' in the final pages.We are not blind to the many good reasons for why this remains the dominant approach. For one thing, philosophical reflections on the currently 'hot topics' are often too transient or unsettled to use them as the backbone for a textbook. Moreover, a proper philosophical understanding of current issues often requires an appreciation of 'core' topics and debates in philosophy of science. To give just one example: to separate hope from hype in debates about 'big data' science, students will profit from having learned about induction, empiricism, and the theory-ladenness of o...