1991
DOI: 10.2307/3440422
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Taxation with Costly Administration

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Cited by 116 publications
(98 citation statements)
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“…What is central is that tax avoidance is a choice under certainty. In this sense, it is close to the formulations in Mayshar (1991) and Slemrod (2001). See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) for a more detailed discussion.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
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“…What is central is that tax avoidance is a choice under certainty. In this sense, it is close to the formulations in Mayshar (1991) and Slemrod (2001). See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) for a more detailed discussion.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…In terms of Gini-coefficients, this means varying the distribution between approximately 0.5 and 0.25, which should cover most actual distributions. 16 The benchmark has a Gini coefficient of 39. parameter combination A = 100, δ = 0.9, means that at a cost equal to the average income in the economy an individual can get a 10 % tax reduction. Even for high tax rates, this is attractive only to very few individuals and hence, the loss of tax base from increased taxation is small, resulting in that a majority of the population would, in such a situation, favor a tax rate of 100%.…”
Section: Political Equilibria With Tax Avoidancementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…With the true income being equal to w t L t ; the amount of income concealed is equal 1 4 See, e.g., Mayshar (1991), Boadway et al (1994), Kopczuk (2001), Slemrod (2001), andChetty (2009). 7 to a t = w t L t I t . The cost of misreporting is expressed by means of the function f (a t ) : Assume that f ( ) is non-negative, increasing in the absolute value of a t and strictly convex with f (0) = f 0 (0) = 0.…”
Section: Fiscal Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Modelos calcados no trabalho seminal de Allingham (1972), doravante referido como modelo A-S, destacam o papel dos incentivos para a eclosão da sonegação (Yitzhaki, 1974, 1979, Mayshar, 1991, Andreoni, 1992. Esses modelos postulam que a existência de alíquotas elevadas, ao aumentar o prêmio para a evasão, estimula a sonegação.…”
Section: Introductionunclassified