2006
DOI: 10.1080/00036840500427106
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Taxation and political business cycles in EU economies

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Cited by 13 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Rational expectation models of political business cycles have received strong empirical support in studies by Alesina and Roubini (1992) and Alesina et al (1997) for OECD countries. In contrast, Andrikopoulos et al (2004, 2006) test whether incumbent national governments of the EU member states manipulate the fiscal policy instruments in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan. Their empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rational expectation models of political business cycles have received strong empirical support in studies by Alesina and Roubini (1992) and Alesina et al (1997) for OECD countries. In contrast, Andrikopoulos et al (2004, 2006) test whether incumbent national governments of the EU member states manipulate the fiscal policy instruments in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan. Their empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In these years, the dummy variable gets 1, and 0 in the others. Andrikopoulos et al (2006) then take into account how long the political leaders have been in power. Another possible solution comes from Bracco et al (2013), who claim that attention should be paid to the development of the electoral cycle itself.…”
Section: The Factor Of Holding Parliamentary Elections As the Main Exmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Econ., Florianópolis, v. 21 n. 1, p. 01 -24, dez/mar. 2018ISSN 2175 Esse comportamento oportunista foi estudados também ao nível das nações, por Vergne (2006), Andrikopoulos et al (2006), Potrafke (2012), Katsimi e Sarantides (2012), Ehrhart (2013, Morozumi, Veiga e Veiga (2014). Para os governos estaduais pode-se citar os trabalhos de Blais e Nadeau (1992), Berger e Woitck (1997), Seitz (1998), Kneebone e Mckenzie (2001), Akhmedov e Zhuravskaya (2004), Tellier (2006), Nakaguma e Bender (2006) e Lautenschlage (aceito para publicação) Rogoff (1990) percebeu que há, geralmente, uma alteração na composição dos gastos governamentais, em anos com eleições, ou seja, há uma preferência por despesas que tenham uma maior e imediata visibilidade.…”
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