Tax policy as industrial policy in comparative capitalisms

Haffert, Lukas

doi:10.1080/17487870.2019.1638115

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 44 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In recent years, the direct impact of industrial policy on cross-border mergers and acquisitions had been extensively studied [27][28][29][30][31] . Some researchers had concluded that industrial policies could directly promote listed crossborder M&A, while others believed that industrial policies hindered listed companies' cross-border M&A.…”

Section: The Direct Impact Of Industrial Policy On Cross-border Merge...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Haffert had pointed out that when a nation crafted explicit industrial policies for a specific sector, signaling strong support and encouragement, it was often accompanied by a series of favorable measures, such as tax reductions, preferential loans, and R&D funding assistance 27 . These actions aimed to enhance the core competitiveness of industry enterprises and attract external investments, particularly in the realm of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A).…”

Section: Theoretical Basis Analysis and Research Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The influence mechanism of industrial policies on Chinese companies' cross-border M&A decision-making

Shen,

Yang,

et al. 2023

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study explored the potential links between Chinese industrial policy and cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms from 2009 to 2019. Based on describing China's industrial strategy and evaluating the then-current situation of Chinese enterprises' cross-border mergers and acquisitions, this empirical study constructed a two-way fixed-effect panel model and an intermediate effect model to assess the mechanism of industrial policy's influence on Chinese enterprises' cross-border mergers and acquisitions decisions. The findings were as follows: (1) Industrial policy could promote the implementation of cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises; (2) By easing financial restrictions, industrial policy could improve firms' access to capital and encourage cross-border mergers and acquisitions. (3) Industrial policies could promote the high political relevance of state-owned enterprises, thus promoting the success of transnational mergers and acquisitions of enterprises. Therefore, it was significant to promote the transformation of industrial policy from subsidy-oriented to performance-oriented and rationally evaluate the risks and benefits of M&A for enterprises to complete cross-border M&A.

show abstract

Section: The Direct Impact Of Industrial Policy On Cross-border Merge...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Basis Analysis and Research Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence mechanism of industrial policies on Chinese companies' cross-border M&A decision-making

Shen,

Yang,

et al. 2023

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…EU member states designed a series of fiscally neutral instruments to support their economy (Clift and Woll, 2012; Thatcher, 2014b). For instance, tax policy has been identified as a key tool for mid-range interventions aimed at favoring specific sectors, industries, or firms on account of its less evident fiscal repercussions (Haffert, 2021; Katzenstein, 1978, Introduction). Similarly, a recent study finds how regulatory forbearance replaced direct subsidies as a tool to promote the development of specific sectors or firms when state actors lack the fiscal space and legal competence to do so (Dewey and Di Carlo, 2021).…”

Section: Open-market Industrial Policy and Its Main Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Industrial policy and comparative political economy: A literature review and research agenda

Bulfone

2022

Competition & Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Great Recession renewed calls for a return of state activism in support of the European economy. The widespread nationalizations of ailing companies and the growing activism of national development banks led many to celebrate the re-appearance of industrial policy. Despite this reappraisal, however, comparative political economy (CPE) contributions to the study of industrial policy are still scarce. This review article critically overviews the existing literature linking CPE and industrial policy meeting three goals. First, to trace the evolution of the goals, protagonists, and policy instruments of industrial policy in the European Union (EU) since the post-war period. Second, to provide a periodization of the evolution of industrial policy based on the distinction between the inward-looking forms of state intervention prevalent until the late 1970s and the open-market industrial policy of later decades. Third, to outline future research pathways based on the integration between CPE, heterodox economics, and economic geography.

show abstract

“…redistribution and stabilization). But governments have made extensive use of tax policy's allocative function (Musgrave 1959) as an instrument of industrial policy-for example, to attract capitals in a global economy (Reurink & Bernardo 2020) or to grant fiscal subsidies (Thatcher 2014)-and foster distinctive models of capitalism (Shonfield 1965;Haffert 2019). If, with governments' connivance, tax regulations are enforced only for some producer groups, regions or sectors but not for others, the latter de facto enjoy a tolerated exemption vis-à-vis other actors subjected to effective enforcement.…”

Section: The Economic Logic Of Forbearancementioning

confidence: 99%

Governing through non‐enforcement: Regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economies

Dewey

Carlo

2021

Regulation & Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Political economy scholarship generally assumes that governments are interested in enforcing economic regulations. Cases of non‐enforcement are predominantly studied in the context of developing countries and are chiefly associated with states' deficient institutional capacity. This article casts doubts on these assumptions by showing how governments in advanced democracies manipulate the regulatory regime and generate selective non‐enforcement of economic regulations to shape markets at their discretion. We argue that regulatory forbearance becomes an attractive form of industrial policy when governments are prevented from intervening discretionally in markets due to legal obstacles, which they cannot overcome; or when the productive structure of the country makes alternative forms of intervention unviable. Drawing on the study of tax non‐enforcement in two most‐different cases of strong and weak state capacity such as Germany and Italy, the article theorizes three techniques through which governments manipulate regulatory regimes: legal and organizational sabotage and shirking. By shedding light on the economic logic of forbearance, the article points at non‐enforcement as an overlooked mode of regulatory governance and suggests the need to inquire further into governments' strategic agency behind regulatory regimes.

show abstract

Tax policy as industrial policy in comparative capitalisms

Cited by 7 publications

References 44 publications

The influence mechanism of industrial policies on Chinese companies' cross-border M&A decision-making

The influence mechanism of industrial policies on Chinese companies' cross-border M&A decision-making

Industrial policy and comparative political economy: A literature review and research agenda

Governing through non‐enforcement: Regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economies

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About