In comparison to some illegal enterprises whose operations generate decisive moral rejection on the part of the public, vehicle theft remains an illicit underground activity that citizens largely tolerate or even exploit. In the province of Buenos Aires, the persistence, depth and breadth of transactions related to this black market cannot be explained without referring to the role of the state police. This article uses a theoretical approach to illegal police protection in order to understand the complicity between the police and criminals as fundamental to the market for stolen cars in the province. Using data from in-depth interviews and official documents, the article examines how exactly the police protect thieves, dismantlers and distributors of cars and/or auto parts. It analyses three elements that condition the sale of illegal protection to criminals by the police: threats and selective implementation of penalties; control of consequences; and bureaucratic falsification.En comparación con algunas empresas ilegales cuyas operaciones generan un rechazo moral claro de parte del público, el robo de vehículos se mantiene como una actividad ilícita subterránea que la mayoría de ciudadanos toleran e incluso explotan. En la provincia de Buenos Aires la persistencia, profundidad y amplitud de las transacciones relacionadas con este mercado negro no se puede explicar sin tocar el papel de la policía estatal. Este artículo utiliza un enfoque teórico sobre la protección policial ilegal con el fin de entender la complicidad entre la policía y los delincuentes como un nexo fundamental en el mercado de automóviles robados en la provincia. Utilizando datos de entrevistas en profundidad y de documentos oficiales, el artículo examina cómo exactamente la policía protege a los ladrones y a quienes desmantelan y distribuyen automóviles y/o autopartes. Se analizan tres elementos que condicionan la venta de protección policial ilegal a los delincuentes: amenazas e implementación selectiva de castigos; control de las consecuencias; y la falsificación burocrática de evidencias.Contrastando com empreitadas ilegais cujo funcionamento provoca rejeição moral decisiva do público, o roubo de automóveis segue como uma atividade ilícita amplamente tolerada, inclusive explorada, pelos cidadões. Na província de Buenos Aires, a persistência, profundidade e amplitude de transações relacionadas a este mercado negro não podem ser explicadas sem referência ao papel da policía do estado. Este artigo utiliza uma abordagem teórica para estudar a proteção policial ilegal e compreender a complicidade entre a polícia e os criminosos como algo fundamental para o funcionamento do mercado de carros roubados na provincia. Utilizando dados obtidos por entrevistas aprofundadas e de documentos oficiais, o artigo examina como exatamente a polícia proteje os ladrões, desmanteladores e distribuidores de carros e/ou auto peças. Ele analisa três elementos que condicionam a venda de proteção ilegal policial aos criminosos: ameaças e a implementação seletiva de p...
By moving away from dualistic perspectives that see social order as the product of strong states but not weak states, this article develops a conceptual framework for interpreting hybrid social orders, i.e. those established by both legal and extra-legal actors. The initial premise is that hybrid forms of social domination resulting from the interaction between legal and extra-legal actors, and regulated by a combination of rational bureaucratic and neo-patrimonial rules, produce relevant economic and political outcomes such as job creation, the supply of basic services and the production of authority. Especially in contexts of continuous economic crisis, ethnic segregation, social marginalization and persistent inequality, these outcomes have ordering effects both in terms of reducing uncertainty and regulating social expectations. Furthermore, in such social contexts, socially tolerated illegal markets play a decisive role. Supported by recent and innovative research, this article concludes with hypotheses intended to promote further research.
By default, stateness is usually considered as a state's legal ability to deliver goods or services. this understanding implies that stateness is structured by the rule of law. However, as historical and current examples show, this legal ability often relies on practices that one would define as illegal and that any measure of 'stateness' must take into account. using the case of the police of the province of Buenos aires as an example, i propose the notion of hybrid stateness i.e. an understanding of stateness that considers the state's ability to operate illegally. this short piece addresses the institutional and budgetary setting of the provincial police force and tackles the question of where the illegal resources for performing police's duties come from.Key words: Hybrid stateness, illegality, police, Buenos aires, protection. RESUMEN
The obstacles to implementing labor standards in the garment industry have been addressed by a significant body of literature which increasingly considers local institutions. This includes viewing states and government actors as predictors of compliance. Yet fine-grained studies on how the interplay of informal institutions and local actors' interests prevents standards being implemented are still lacking. Drawing on seven months of ethnographic fieldwork at the main supply center for sweatshop produced and counterfeit clothing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, this article shows how these actors' tolerance toward the sweatshop economy obstructs the implementation of labor standards. According to empirical evidence, this tolerance means protecting certain actors, i.e. non-enforcing the law. Accordingly, the paper distinguishes between two types of protection: provided by state or by political actors. By uncovering the workings of informal institutions and the political actors' logics, this article helps to understand why deplorable labor conditions in the garment industry persist.JEL classification: J80 labor standards: general, K42 illegal behavior and the enforcement of law, Z13 economic sociology, economic anthropology; social and economic stratification
Political economy scholarship generally assumes that governments are interested in enforcing economic regulations. Cases of non‐enforcement are predominantly studied in the context of developing countries and are chiefly associated with states' deficient institutional capacity. This article casts doubts on these assumptions by showing how governments in advanced democracies manipulate the regulatory regime and generate selective non‐enforcement of economic regulations to shape markets at their discretion. We argue that regulatory forbearance becomes an attractive form of industrial policy when governments are prevented from intervening discretionally in markets due to legal obstacles, which they cannot overcome; or when the productive structure of the country makes alternative forms of intervention unviable. Drawing on the study of tax non‐enforcement in two most‐different cases of strong and weak state capacity such as Germany and Italy, the article theorizes three techniques through which governments manipulate regulatory regimes: legal and organizational sabotage and shirking. By shedding light on the economic logic of forbearance, the article points at non‐enforcement as an overlooked mode of regulatory governance and suggests the need to inquire further into governments' strategic agency behind regulatory regimes.
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