Tax evasion and income source: A comparative experimental study

Gërxhani, Klarita; Schram, Arthur

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.08.002

Cited by 101 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 49 publications

(58 reference statements)

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“…Studies examining the effect of culture on tax compliance have therefore attempted to examine the behavior of individuals from different cultural backgrounds when placed in a similar environment. One strand of literature has compared tax evasion in similar laboratory experiments across two or three countries (for example, Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan 1995;Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler 2009;Gërxhani and Schram 2006;Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl, and Villeval 2011). These studies generally find differences across countries in tax evasion despite similar subject pools and experimental protocols.…”

Section: Culturementioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Morale

Luttmer

Singhal²

2014

Journal of Economic Perspectives

561

392

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For over 40 years, the benchmark economic model of tax evasion has been the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, in which self-interested taxpayers choose how much income to report to the tax authority by trading off the benefits of evasion (lower tax payments) against the costs of evasion (the possibility of being caught and punished). In this model, the key policy parameters affecting tax evasion are the tax rate, the detection probability, and the penalty imposed conditional on the evasion being detected.However, there is an apparent disconnect between much of the academic literature on tax compliance and the administration of tax policy. While tax administrators are obviously concerned about enforcement, they also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on improving "tax morale," by which they generally mean increasing voluntary compliance with tax laws and creating a social norm of compliance. The OECD (2001), for example, noted that " [t]he promotion of voluntary compliance should be a primary concern of revenue authorities" in its principles for good tax administration, and it has highlighted the importance of tax morale more generally (OECD 2013).Tax authorities around the world pursue policies that reflect their belief that nonpecuniary factors are important in tax compliance decisions. More than half of US states have or have had "name and shame" programs in which the names of top tax debtors are revealed publicly on state websites. In a more colorful example, the Tax Morale

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Section: Culturementioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Morale

Luttmer

Singhal²

2014

Journal of Economic Perspectives

561

392

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“…Similarly, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999) show that the social norm falls, often collapsing virtually to zero, when there is a so-cial expression via group selection of the fiscal regime of a willingness to tolerate tax evasion, such as a majority vote in favor of reduced enforcement on detected evasion; however, they also find that the norm can be improved (and compliance can be increased) when there is a social expression of an unwillingness to tolerate tax evasion. Torgler (2003) and Gërxhani and Schram (2006) also find experimental evidence that that the social norm can be affected by the institutions that face individuals, by individuals' attitudes toward these institutions, and by individual participation in the selection of those institutions.…”

Section: Testing the Expanded Model Using Experimental Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying Behavioral Economics to the Public Sector

Alm¹,

Bourdeaux²

2013

HPE-RPE

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Summary"Behavioral economics", or the application of methods and evidence from other social sciences to economics, has increased greatly in significance in the last two decades. In this paper we discuss the basic elements of behavioral economics. We then assess several applications of behavioral economics to the analysis of the public sector, including specific applications to public economics and, importantly, to the closely related area of public budgeting. We conclude with suggestions on -and predictions oftopics in which future applications should prove useful.

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“…Tax evasion may also result from the fact that tax law is complicated (Kosonen and Ropponen 2015). Gërxhani and Schram (2006) give participants a choice between two options for making money. One is more profitable in expectation, but tax evasion is impossible.…”

Section: C) Tax Evasionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology

Engel

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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Tax evasion and income source: A comparative experimental study

Cited by 101 publications

References 49 publications

Tax Morale

Tax Morale

Applying Behavioral Economics to the Public Sector

Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology

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