Tax Morale

Luttmer, Erzo F. P.; Singhal, Monica

doi:10.1257/jep.28.4.149

Cited by 564 publications

(461 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Still, these results are not universal (Hallsworth, 2014;Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). One reason may be that different people update their beliefs differently and average effects mask valuable heterogeneous responses (Castro and Scartascini, 2015).…”

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Cultural factors play a role in this, but also the individual's relationship to the state (reciprocity or fiscal exchange), and the relationship and behavior of other people (peer effects or social influence). People tend to comply more if they believe that others comply as well, and if they believe that the government makes good use of the money it collects (Alm, 2006;Luttmer and Singhal, 2014;Scholz and Lubell, 1998;Torgler, 2005).…”

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Evidence so far -usually based on messages delivered in letters-has been mixed (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). where, as in Dwenger et al (2016), s is a parameter that measures the strength of the relationship between paying taxes on time and utility.…”

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moral messages may induce taxpayers to pay their taxes (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014), and households to reduce energy consumption (Ito et al, 2015;Allcott and Rogers, 2014). The effectiveness of these positive incentives is not independent of their design.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do Rewards Work?: Evidence from the Randomization of Public Works

Carrillo¹,

Castro²,

Scartascini³

2017

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work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.http://www.iadb.org 2017 Abstract * This paper evaluates the effect of positive inducements on tax behavior by exploiting a natural experiment in which a municipality of Argentina randomly selected 400 individuals among more than 72,000 taxpayers who had complied with payment of their property tax. These individuals were publicly recognized and awarded the construction of a sidewalk. Results indicate that: i) being selected in the lottery and publicly recognized by the government has a positive but not persistent effect on future compliance; ii) receiving the sidewalk has a large positive and persistent effect; iii) high and persistent spillover effects exist: some neighbors of those who receive the reward comply more too, and these effects can be even larger than the direct effects; and iv) there is no financial motive effect; i.e., people do not pay their taxes just to participate in the lottery. Recognition serves only as a short-term incentive, but the provision of a durable and visible good has more persistent and broader effects. These findings provide evidence on features that make a positive inducement more successful, whether for tax compliance or other policy purposes.JEL classifications: C93, H42, H23, D62

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Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Do Rewards Work?: Evidence from the Randomization of Public Works

Carrillo¹,

Castro²,

Scartascini³

2017

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“…For illustration, a tax that is collected by religious institution as obligatory tax, but there is no significant enforcement, this tax has a significant tax compliance (Dwenger et al 2014). In contrast, Luttmer & Singhal (2014) examine that in a country with strict enforcement, tax morale is seen as an important aspect of society. While a country with a lack of law enforcement, tax compliance may not be deemed necessary.…”

Section: Motivation To Complymentioning

confidence: 99%

What are the Challenges in Designing An Effective Personal Income Tax System?

Raeni¹,

Sari²

2016

ECON FINANC INDONES

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This article aims to examine the challenges of designing individual's income tax systems in general and particularly to observe taxpayers' behaviour in developing countries. This study used case study approach to gain in depth understanding type of taxpayers' attitude towards personal income tax systems. Based on the analyses, tax behaviour, which comprises the perception of fairness and motivation to comply, attracts urgent challenges in designing effective tax on personal income in every country and mainly underdeveloped countries. Every human being in each country has their social pattern towards tax policy. When the individual perception of fairness is significant, it will harmonise the 'client and service approach' between taxpayers and governments. This condition would influence tax morale of individuals to comply with the policy and achieve high compliance rate. Therefore, it has argued that personal view of fairness and their motivation to comply with tax systems are becoming vital challenges in designing the tax policy on individual income. Keywords: Personal Income Tax; Fairness; Tax Moral AbstrakArtikel ini bertujuan untuk menginvestigasi tantangan-tantangan yang dihadapi dalam merancang sistem perpajakan untuk wajib pajak orang pribadi dan secara khusus menganalisa perilaku wajib pajak di negara-negara berkembang. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan studi literatur untuk mendapatkan secara mendalam jenis perilaku wajib pajak penghasilan orang pribadi. Berdasarkan hasil analisis terkait perilaku pajak, yang terdiri dari persepsi keadilan dan motivasi untuk mematuhi memberikan tantangan tersendiri dalam merancang pajak yang berlaku atas penghasilan pribadi di setiap negara dan terutama negara-negara berkembang. Setiap individu memiliki pola yang berbeda ketika berinteraksi terhadap kebijakan pajak. Ketika persepsi individu terhadap keadilan adalah signifikan, hal itu akan menyelaraskan pendekatan 'client and service' antara pembayar pajak dan pemerintah. Kondisi ini akan memengaruhi semangat individu untuk mematuhi kebijakan dan mencapai tingkat kepatuhan yang tinggi. Oleh karena itu, asumsi bahwa pandangan individu terhadap keadilan dan motivasi untuk mematuhi sistem pajak menjadi tantangan penting dalam merancang kebijakan terhadap wajib pajak orang pribadi.

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Cross‐border regulatory cooperation and corporate tax avoidance

Yu,

Hsieh,

Tsang

2024

J Corp Accounting Finance

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We examine whether improved cross‐border regulatory cooperation and information exchange affect corporate tax avoidance. We find that the improvement in the regulators’ capacity to access to information in foreign countries through their entrance into the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) effectively reduces corporate tax avoidance. Moreover, the effect of the MMoU on corporate tax avoidance is stronger for firms that are less income mobile and have no significant subsidiaries in tax havens. Collectively, these findings support the conjecture that the strengthened cross‐border regulatory cooperation and information exchange provided by the MMoU creates a positive externality in reducing corporate tax avoidance behavior.

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Tax Morale

Cited by 564 publications

References 23 publications

Do Rewards Work?: Evidence from the Randomization of Public Works

Do Rewards Work?: Evidence from the Randomization of Public Works

What are the Challenges in Designing An Effective Personal Income Tax System?

Cross‐border regulatory cooperation and corporate tax avoidance

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