Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 2017
DOI: 10.4337/9781781950210.00017
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Tax evasion and avoidance

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Cited by 19 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…The literature on tax evasion is devoted mainly to income taxation, and concentrates on how evasion can be deterred through detection and sanctions (Franzoni, ) . Rational consumers decide whether or not to evade payment of their taxes based on a cost‐benefit comparison .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The literature on tax evasion is devoted mainly to income taxation, and concentrates on how evasion can be deterred through detection and sanctions (Franzoni, ) . Rational consumers decide whether or not to evade payment of their taxes based on a cost‐benefit comparison .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the theoretical literature on tax evasion, the seminal work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) is the first to consider tax evasion as a decision under risk. 1 The literature on tax evasion is devoted mainly to income taxation, 2 and concentrates on how evasion can be deterred through detection and sanctions (Franzoni, 1999). 3 Rational consumers decide whether or not to evade payment of their taxes based on a cost-benefit comparison.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Bigio and Zilberman (2011), Carillo et al (2011), and Tonin (2013. Models with a continuum of tax payers and cut-off rules for auditing are usually characterised by bunching (at the cut-off), but not necessarily by the absence of a whole interval of income declarations (see Franzoni 2009 for a survey). Similar features, that is, bunching and the absence of certain income declarations, will result if there is no evasion while taxation entails fixed administrative cost, such that it may be optimal to effectively exempt those with low (potential) tax bases from taxation (cf.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 4 The issue of enforcement has a major role in explaining tax evasion. See, among others, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Engel and Hines (1999), Franzoni (1999), and Snow and Warren (2005). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%