Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

“…In this paper, the central government's prerogatives are limited, whereas the fiscal federalism literature adopts the same extreme assumptions that we mention in the Introduction. On the one hand, Cremer et al (1996), Raff and Wilson (1997), Cremer and Pestieau (1997), Bucovetsky et al (1998) and Bordignon et al (2001) do not limit the prerogatives of the central government. On the other hand, Lockwood (1999), Silva (2000, 2002) and Besfamille (2004) impose participation constraints on the design of intergovernmental grants.…”

“…For the sake of simplicity, we set d = d 2 . Second, the informational superiority of the local authority can be justified, as in Crémer et al (1995), and Bucovetsky et al (1998), on political economy grounds. To win elections, politicians need to know the preferences of their voters.…”

Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants Under Asymmetric Information

“…There is a growing literature on fiscal federalism under asymmetric information, for example, Cremer, Marchand and Pestieu (1996), Raff and Wilson (1997), Bucovetsky, Marchand andPestieu (1998), Lockwood (1999), Cornes and Silva (2002) and Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001). However, since all these studies include in their analysis at most one public good, they cannot explain the use of categorical block grants, and they also do not make the point for closed-ended matching grants.…”