Abstract:Those concerned by low electoral turnouts have considered various solutions, including compulsory voting. Arguing that our first concern should be to ensure that everyone has a genuine opportunity to vote, Ben Saunders presents a scheme of targeted coercion focused on giving first‐time voters a taste of their democratic rights.
“…Such would be the case with convenience voting schemes, e.g., voting by mail or e-voting, which might neutralize the disadvantage in free time that younger people have, but damage equal opportunity of influence due to the impossibility of ensuring the same ballot secrecy as that provided by the polling booth (in turn, making the exertion of undue pressure on voters easier). Similarly, one-off compulsory voting schemes that could habituate young voters to vote throughout their lifetime (Saunders, 2010) or civic education programs that might achieve the same end do not reduce the unequal costs of influencing elections, but render the choice not to influence electoral outcomes more costly for young voters. This compounds the said structural costs, and thus runs contrary to its professed purpose.…”
Section: Age-weighted Votes Under the Synchronic Accountmentioning
Are there any prima facie reasons that democracies might have for disenfranchising older citizens? This question reflects increasingly salient, but often incompletely theorized complaints that members of democratic publics advance about older citizens’ electoral influence. Rather than rejecting these complaints out of hand, we explore whether, suitably reconstructed, they withstand democratic scrutiny. More specifically, we examine whether the account of political equality that seems to most fittingly capture the logic of these complaints – namely, equal opportunity of political influence over electoral outcomes – can justify disenfranchising older citizens. We conclude that equal opportunity of influence cannot ground a blanket disenfranchisement of older people and that, taken in conjunction with other general considerations that apply to all sound electoral policies, partial disenfranchisement proposals (i.e. proposals for reducing the electoral influence of older citizens via age-weighted voting) are both quasi-inapplicable and practically unrobust across a relevant range of political contexts.
“…Such would be the case with convenience voting schemes, e.g., voting by mail or e-voting, which might neutralize the disadvantage in free time that younger people have, but damage equal opportunity of influence due to the impossibility of ensuring the same ballot secrecy as that provided by the polling booth (in turn, making the exertion of undue pressure on voters easier). Similarly, one-off compulsory voting schemes that could habituate young voters to vote throughout their lifetime (Saunders, 2010) or civic education programs that might achieve the same end do not reduce the unequal costs of influencing elections, but render the choice not to influence electoral outcomes more costly for young voters. This compounds the said structural costs, and thus runs contrary to its professed purpose.…”
Section: Age-weighted Votes Under the Synchronic Accountmentioning
Are there any prima facie reasons that democracies might have for disenfranchising older citizens? This question reflects increasingly salient, but often incompletely theorized complaints that members of democratic publics advance about older citizens’ electoral influence. Rather than rejecting these complaints out of hand, we explore whether, suitably reconstructed, they withstand democratic scrutiny. More specifically, we examine whether the account of political equality that seems to most fittingly capture the logic of these complaints – namely, equal opportunity of political influence over electoral outcomes – can justify disenfranchising older citizens. We conclude that equal opportunity of influence cannot ground a blanket disenfranchisement of older people and that, taken in conjunction with other general considerations that apply to all sound electoral policies, partial disenfranchisement proposals (i.e. proposals for reducing the electoral influence of older citizens via age-weighted voting) are both quasi-inapplicable and practically unrobust across a relevant range of political contexts.
“…This is an infringement of negative freedom, which is especially problematic if there are less coercive alternatives (Whelan 2018, p. 161;Brennan 2014, pp. 19-23;Saunders 2010bSaunders , 2012b. Proponents of mandatory turnout usually acknowledge the coercive element as one reason why the policy requires justification (see, e.g., Umbers 2018, pp.…”
The discussion on mandatory turnout, which controversially introduces coercion at the heart of the electoral process, illustrates a dilemma between increasing voter turnout on the one hand and avoiding coercion on the other. If successful, a recent proposal by Elliott solves this dilemma as it removes the compulsory element of mandatory turnout. Specifically, Elliot reinterprets the policy’s purpose as (a) a pre-commitment device for those who believe that they have a duty to vote and (b) a nudge to the surveillance of politics for those who do not believe this. We critically evaluate Elliott’s novel intervention in the debate and argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful. Mandatory turnout can be interpreted as neither a pre-commitment device nor a nudge. Moreover, we present a more promising and novel solution to the dilemma: a genuine state-administered pre-commitment device with respect to voting that also nudges citizens to vote and seems prima facie attractive.
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