Task constraints mask great apes' ability to solve the trap-table task.

Girndt, Antje; Meier, Tabea; Call, Josep

doi:10.1037/0097-7403.34.1.54

Cited by 53 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…However, there is no conclusive evidence that non-human animals can use causal knowledge rather than associative learning to solve complex physical problems ( Visalberghi & Limongelli 1994;Limongelli et al 1995;Povinelli 2000;Fujita et al 2003;Call 2004;Tebbich & Bshary 2004;Cunningham et al 2006;Mulcahy & Call 2006;Santos et al 2006;Seed et al 2006;Penn & Povinelli 2007;Girndt et al 2008;Martin-Ordas et al 2008;Sabbatini & Visalberghi 2008). The absence of evidence that non-human animals use sophisticated cognition when solving complex physical problems has led to suggestions that causal reasoning in humans is fundamentally different (Penn & Povinelli 2007;Penn et al 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In all these studies, one tool was positioned in front of the trap and another in front of the flat surface. Recently it has been shown that apes make far fewer errors when they are only given one tool and can choose between the trap and surface (Girndt et al 2008). The majority of apes (20 out of 24) when given a single tool avoided the trap on the first trial, suggesting that they were sensitive to the causal relations in the task.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do New Caledonian crows solve physical problems through causal reasoning?

et al. 2008

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The extent to which animals other than humans can reason about physical problems is contentious. The benchmark test for this ability has been the trap-tube task. We presented New Caledonian crows with a series of two-trap versions of this problem. Three out of six crows solved the initial trap-tube. These crows continued to avoid the trap when the arbitrary features that had previously been associated with successful performances were removed. However, they did not avoid the trap when a hole and a functional trap were in the tube. In contrast to a recent primate study, the three crows then solved a causally equivalent but visually distinct problem-the trap-table task. The performance of the three crows across the four transfers made explanations based on chance, associative learning, visual and tactile generalization, and previous dispositions unlikely. Our findings suggest that New Caledonian crows can solve complex physical problems by reasoning both causally and analogically about causal relations. Causal and analogical reasoning may form the basis of the New Caledonian crow's exceptional tool skills.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do New Caledonian crows solve physical problems through causal reasoning?

et al. 2008

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“…Our dataset included eight scores corresponding to the following eight tasks: spatial knowledge [9], tooluse [10], inferential reasoning by exclusion [11], quantity discrimination [12], causal reasoning [13] and colour, size and shape discrimination learning [14]. Some scores were formed by averaging several items that measured a particular ability while other scores represented a single item (see the electronic supplementary material, table S1).…”

Section: Identifying Special Individualsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are there geniuses among the apes?

Herrmann

Call

2012

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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We are often asked whether some apes are smarter than others. Here we used two individual-based datasets on cognitive abilities to answer this question and to elucidate the structure of individual differences. We identified some individuals who consistently scored well across multiple tasks, and even one individual who could be classified as exceptional when compared with her conspecifics. However, we found no general intelligence factor. Instead, we detected some clusters of certain abilities, including inferences, learning and perhaps a tool-use and quantities cluster. Thus, apes in general and chimpanzees in particular present a pattern characterized by the existence of some smart animals but no evidence of a general intelligence factor. This conclusion contrasts with previous studies that have found evidence of a g factor in primates. However, those studies have used group-based as opposed to the individual-based data used here, which means that the two sets of analyses are not directly comparable. We advocate an approach based on testing multiple individuals (of multiple species) on multiple tasks that capture cognitive, motivational and temperament factors affecting performance. One of the advantages of this approach is that it may contribute to reconcile the general and domain-specific views on primate intelligence.

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“…Despite the fact that we can be reasonably certain that adult humans' physical cognition consists of an intuitive understanding of constructs such as "gravity" and "transfer of force," and that the causal structure and dimensions of the problem used in Experiment 1 were identical to those used previously to study people's folk physics (e.g., Silva & Silva, 2010), modifying a single stick to an ideal length produced different results from selecting a stick from a set of ten. That this difference, which is related to the "evaluation and choice" phase of the problem rather than the "execution and solving" phase, influenced the length of the sticks that people preferred underscores the necessity of studying physical cognition in relation to a particular causal structure by using a variety of tasks and methods (Girndt, Meier, & Call, 2008;MartinOrdas, Jaeck, & Call, 2012;Seed, Call, Emery, & Clayton, 2009;Tecwyn et al, 2012;Teschke & Tebbich, 2011).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Task-specific modulation of adult humans’ tool preferences: number of choices and size of the problem

2014

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In two experiments, we examined the effect of modifications to the features of a stick-and-tube problem on the stick lengths that adult humans used to solve the problem. In Experiment 1, we examined whether people's tool preferences for retrieving an out-of-reach object in a tube might more closely resemble those reported with laboratory crows if people could modify a single stick to an ideal length to solve the problem. Contrary to when adult humans have selected a tool from a set of ten sticks, asking people to modify a single stick to retrieve an object did not generally result in a stick whose length was related to the object's distance. Consistent with the prior research, though, the working length of the stick was related to the object's distance. In Experiment 2, we examined the effect of increasing the scale of the stick-andtube problem on people's tool preferences. Increasing the scale of the task influenced people to select relatively shorter tools than had selected in previous studies. Although the causal structures of the tasks used in the two experiments were identical, their results were not. This underscores the necessity of studying physical cognition in relation to a particular causal structure by using a variety of tasks and methods.

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Task constraints mask great apes' ability to solve the trap-table task.

Cited by 53 publications

References 16 publications

Do New Caledonian crows solve physical problems through causal reasoning?

Do New Caledonian crows solve physical problems through causal reasoning?

Are there geniuses among the apes?

Task-specific modulation of adult humans’ tool preferences: number of choices and size of the problem

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