No abstract

Many animals use tools but only humans are generally considered to have the cognitive sophistication required for cumulative technological evolution. Three important characteristics of cumulative technological evolution are: (i) the diversification of tool design; (ii) cumulative change; and (iii) high-fidelity social transmission. We present evidence that crows have diversified and cumulatively changed the design of their pandanus tools. In 2000 we carried out an intensive survey in New Caledonia to establish the geographical variation in the manufacture of these tools. We documented the shapes of 5550 tools from 21 sites throughout the range of pandanus tool manufacture. We found three distinct pandanus tool designs: wide tools, narrow tools and stepped tools. The lack of ecological correlates of the three tool designs and their different, continuous and overlapping geographical distributions make it unlikely that they evolved independently. The similarities in the manufacture method of each design further suggest that pandanus tools have gone through a process of cumulative change from a common historical origin. We propose a plausible scenario for this rudimentary cumulative evolution.

A crucial stage in hominin evolution was the development of metatool use -- the ability to use one tool on another [1, 2]. Although the great apes can solve metatool tasks [3, 4], monkeys have been less successful [5-7]. Here we provide experimental evidence that New Caledonian crows can spontaneously solve a demanding metatool task in which a short tool is used to extract a longer tool that can then be used to obtain meat. Six out of the seven crows initially attempted to extract the long tool with the short tool. Four successfully obtained meat on the first trial. The experiments revealed that the crows did not solve the metatool task by trial-and-error learning during the task or through a previously learned rule. The sophisticated physical cognition shown appears to have been based on analogical reasoning. The ability to reason analogically may explain the exceptional tool-manufacturing skills of New Caledonian crows.

The extent to which animals other than humans can reason about physical problems is contentious. The benchmark test for this ability has been the trap-tube task. We presented New Caledonian crows with a series of two-trap versions of this problem. Three out of six crows solved the initial trap-tube. These crows continued to avoid the trap when the arbitrary features that had previously been associated with successful performances were removed. However, they did not avoid the trap when a hole and a functional trap were in the tube. In contrast to a recent primate study, the three crows then solved a causally equivalent but visually distinct problem-the trap-table task. The performance of the three crows across the four transfers made explanations based on chance, associative learning, visual and tactile generalization, and previous dispositions unlikely. Our findings suggest that New Caledonian crows can solve complex physical problems by reasoning both causally and analogically about causal relations. Causal and analogical reasoning may form the basis of the New Caledonian crow's exceptional tool skills.

The ability of some bird species to pull up meat hung on a string is a famous example of spontaneous animal problem solving. The “insight” hypothesis claims that this complex behaviour is based on cognitive abilities such as mental scenario building and imagination. An operant conditioning account, in contrast, would claim that this spontaneity is due to each action in string pulling being reinforced by the meat moving closer and remaining closer to the bird on the perch. We presented experienced and naïve New Caledonian crows with a novel, visually restricted string-pulling problem that reduced the quality of visual feedback during string pulling. Experienced crows solved this problem with reduced efficiency and increased errors compared to their performance in standard string pulling. Naïve crows either failed or solved the problem by trial and error learning. However, when visual feedback was available via a mirror mounted next to the apparatus, two naïve crows were able to perform at the same level as the experienced group. Our results raise the possibility that spontaneous string pulling in New Caledonian crows may not be based on insight but on operant conditioning mediated by a perceptual-motor feedback cycle.

New Caledonian crows were presented with Bird and Emery's (2009a) Aesop's fable paradigm, which requires stones to be dropped into a water-filled tube to bring floating food within reach. The crows did not spontaneously use stones as tools, but quickly learned to do so, and to choose objects and materials with functional properties. Some crows discarded both inefficient and non-functional objects before observing their effects on the water level. Interestingly, the crows did not learn to discriminate between functional and non-functional objects and materials when there was an arbitrary, rather than causal, link between object and reward. This finding suggests that the crows' performances were not based on associative learning alone. That is, learning was not guided solely by the covariation rate between stimuli and outcomes or the conditioned reinforcement properties acquired by functional objects. Our results, therefore, show that New Caledonian crows can process causal information not only when it is linked to sticks and stick-like tools but also when it concerns the functional properties of novel types of tool.

Apes, corvids and parrots all show high rates of behavioural innovation in the wild. However, it is unclear whether this innovative behaviour is underpinned by cognition more complex than simple learning mechanisms. To investigate this question we presented New Caledonian crows with a novel three-stage metatool problem. The task involved three distinct stages: (i) obtaining a short stick by pulling up a string, (ii) using the short stick as a metatool to extract a long stick from a toolbox, and finally (iii) using the long stick to extract food from a hole. Crows with previous experience of the behaviours in stages 1 -3 linked them into a novel sequence to solve the problem on the first trial. Crows with experience of only using string and tools to access food also successfully solved the problem. This innovative use of established behaviours in novel contexts was not based on resurgence, chaining and conditional reinforcement. Instead, the performance was consistent with the transfer of an abstract, causal rule: 'out-of-reach objects can be accessed using a tool'. This suggests that high innovation rates in the wild may reflect complex cognitive abilities that supplement basic learning mechanisms.

The main way of gaining insight into the behaviour and neurological faculties of our early ancestors is to study artefactual evidence for the making and use of tools, but this places severe constraints on what knowledge can be obtained. New Caledonian crows, however, offer a potential analogous model system for learning about these difficult-to-establish aspects of prehistoric humans. I found new evidence of human-like specialization in crows' manufacture of hook tools from pandanus leaves: functional lateralization or 'handedness' and the shaping of these tools to a rule system. These population-level features are unprecedented in the tool behaviour of free-living non-humans and provide the first demonstration that a population bias for handedness in tool-making and the shaping of tools to rule systems are not concomitant with symbolic thought and language. It is unknown how crows obtain their tool behaviour. Nevertheless, at the least they can be studied in order to learn about the neuropsychology associated with early specialized and/or advanced population features in tool-making such as hook use, handedness and the shaping of tools to rule systems.