Tarifas de importação e evasão fiscal no Brasil

Kume, Honorio; Piani, Guida; Miranda, Pedro

doi:10.1590/s1413-80502011000100004

Cited by 8 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Mishra et al (2008) confirmed these tariff evasion results for India and found a higher tariff semi‐elasticity of missing imports for products where enforcement of customs law, proxied by the mode of entry, was laxer. More recently, many studies have confirmed the tariff evasion result for various African countries (Arndt and Van Dunem, 2006; Levin and Widell, 2007; Bouet and Roy, 2009), North America (Stoyanov, 2009), Brazil (Kume et al, 2010), and for a cross section of 74 countries (Jean and Mitaritonna, 2010).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

Chinese Networks and Tariff Evasion

Rotunno

Vézina

2012

World Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (2004) with Rauch and Trindade's (2002) study of Chinese trade networks. Chinese networks are known to act as trade catalysts by enforcing contracts and providing market information. As tariff evasion occurs outside the law, market information is scant and formal institutions inexistent, rendering networks the more important. We find robust evidence that Chinese networks, proxied by ethnic Chinese migrant populations, increase tariff evasion, i.e. the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports. We suggest the effects takes place through matching of illicit-minded traders, identification of corrupt customs agents and enforcement of informal contracts. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

Chinese Networks and Tariff Evasion

Rotunno

Vézina

2012

World Economy

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“…Hence, tariffs became the principal trade policy instrument and started to accurately reflect the level of protection faced by the national industry in Brazil. The average ad valorem nominal tariff was 30.5%, but varied substantially across industries, reaching 78.7% in the apparel industry (Kume et al, 2003).…”

Section: The Trade Policy Shockmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Until then, while import duties were very high, the main source of import protection was a wide variety of non-tariff barriers, such as lists of banned products, quantity controls and government procurement restrictions. The protection level effectively faced by a given industry was significantly higher than nominal tariffs alone suggested, leading to a nontransparent structure of protection (see Abreu, 2004, andKume et al, 2003).…”

Section: The Trade Policy Shockmentioning

confidence: 99%

Labor Unions and the Electoral Consequences of Trade Liberalization

Ogeda,

Ornelas,

Soares

2024

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We show that the Brazilian trade liberalization in the early 1990s led to a permanent relative decline in the vote share of left-wing presidential candidates in the regions more affected by the tariff cuts. This happened even though the shock, implemented by a right-wing party, induced a contraction in manufacturing and formal employment in the more affected regions, and despite the left’s identification with protectionist policies. To rationalize this response, we consider a new institutional channel for the political effects of trade shocks: the weakening of labor unions. We provide support for this mechanism in two steps. First, we show that union presence—proxied by the number of workers directly employed by unions, by union density, and by the number of union establishments—declined in regions that became more exposed to foreign competition. Second, we show that the negative effect of tariff reductions on the votes for the left was driven exclusively by political parties with historical links to unions. Furthermore, the impact of the trade liberalization on the vote share of these parties was significant only in regions that had unions operating before the reform. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that tariff cuts reduced the vote share of the left partly through the weakening of labor unions. This institutional channel is fundamentally different from the individual-level responses, motivated by economic or identity concerns, that have been considered in the literature.

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“…When something overseas arrives, along with its property certificate documents, the owner or company should proceed to the customs clearance to free its entrance. After that, a government area (the federal revenue office, "Secretaria da Receita Federal do Ministerio da Fazenda") investigates the authenticity of the declared information (Kume et al, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previously, the import clearance was effected through the import declaration (DI), registered in the integrated foreign trade system (Siscomex). This import clearance presented: invoice (by the exporting company), bill of lading and freight forwarding (from the transport company), and registered information about the product packed (its single price, quantity, weight, and total cost) (Kume et al, 2011). However, Siscomex data was not enough to supply the government impositions -and new system designs and structures were created to assist those already there.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Import and export process: the impact of bureaucratic simplification in customs clearance

Tavares

Castañeda-Ayarza

2022

Ind. Jour. Manag. & Prod.

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The procedures for importing and exporting merchandise in Brazil involve many bureaucratic matters, including federal and international laws. When something overseas arrives, along with its property certificate documents, the owner or company should proceed to the customs clearance to free its entrance. The updating of import and export declarations resulted in redesigning many dispatch companies' internal operation processes. This study aims to analyze the impacts on customs clearance and the advantages and disadvantages caused by simplifying the Brazilian bureaucratic process of importing and exporting. The opportunity was identified to carry out an empirical evaluation of the Brazilian policy of bureaucratic simplification in the import and export processes and its impact on a company's activities. This work has qualitative and descriptive research and presents a case study that sought to analyze the scenario faced by Brasiliense Comissária de Despachos company, located in the city of Campinas in São Paulo, Brazil. The results show that international trade became shorter, more centralized, and transparent with simplifying the import and export process. There was a saving of time and money reported by the company under study by applying DU-E and the possibility of attending more processes in the same period. This article intends to impact society practically through the case study, giving other international trade companies a perspective on the mapping of operations that have been restructured to meet the new simplifications. As for the theory, the impact will be realized by exposing the functioning and existing information on Brazil's import and export system to future researchers.

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Tarifas de importação e evasão fiscal no Brasil

Cited by 8 publications

References 11 publications

Chinese Networks and Tariff Evasion

Chinese Networks and Tariff Evasion

Labor Unions and the Electoral Consequences of Trade Liberalization

Import and export process: the impact of bureaucratic simplification in customs clearance

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