Tangled up in Blue: The Effect of UN Peacekeeping on Nonviolent Protests in Post–Civil War Countries

Abstract

Do peacekeeping missions facilitate nonviolent political contention in post–civil war countries? The nonviolent expression of political grievances is a crucial part of the post–civil war peace-building process but is understudied thus far. We claim that the presence of peacekeepers significantly contributes to establishing a secure environment for nonviolent political contention, particularly nonviolent public protest. In addition, we claim that peacekeeping missions with personnel from countries with robust civil societies are more likely to promote nonviolent political contention because of prior socialization to civic engagement and bottom-top political participation. This is particularly true for UN police personnel (UNPOL), who both train local police forces and have the most direct interaction with protesters. We test our hypotheses using a newly crafted dataset on nonviolent protests in post–civil war countries and peacekeeping missions’ presence, size, and home-country composition. We find that peacekeeping missions’ presence significantly increases nonviolent protests in post–civil war country-years. This effect is largely explained by the presence of UNPOL from countries with strong civil societies. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of post–civil war political revitalization and policy implications for the composition of peacekeeping missions.

Keeping electoral peace? Activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations and their effects on election-related violence

“…Finally, PKOs’ electoral security assistance augments implementation costs of election-related violence since peacekeepers train and supervise domestic security forces in electoral security operations. Research shows that the provision of police and military training by peacekeepers improves the professionalism of host state forces and even diffuses norms of non-violence (Belgioioso et al, 2020). Professional security forces are likely to refuse to implement coercive electoral strategies, e.g.…”

Interventions and repression following civil conflict

“…Currently, UN peacekeeping operations typically include a ‘human rights team’ whose goals are:to contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights through both immediate and long-term action;to empower the population to assert and claim their human rights;to enable State and other national institutions to implement their human rights obligations and uphold the rule of law. (UN Peacekeeping, 2018b: np)UN peacekeeping in the aftermath of civil conflict increases nonviolent protest (Belgioioso, Salvatore & Pinckney, 2020). As such, UN peacekeeping may reduce human rights abuses by changing the threat perceived by the government by policy demands.…”

“…For Hypothesis 1, we focus on the dichotomous presence and then the continuous number of civilians and peacekeeping troops present within a UN mandated intervention. Recent work has indicated that both civilians and troops are important to the pathways through which human rights improve (Kathman & Wood, 2016; Bara, 2020; Belgioioso, Salvatore & Pinckney, 2020; Blair, 2020). Our indicators come from Mullenbach’s (2013) Third Party Peacekeeping Missions Version 3.1 dataset.…”

UN Peacekeeping and Democratization in Conflict-Affected Countries

“…As the number of uniformed personnel deployed to a given UN mission increases, the mission should become better able to reduce violence, neutralize threats from armed actors, and create a stable and predictable environment for voters, candidates, and political parties (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017;Fjelde and Smidt, 2021). Uniformed personnel can also create space for civic engagement, and have been associated with increased levels of peaceful protest in post-conflict countries (Belgioioso, Di Salvatore, and Pinckney, 2021).…”