Taming conceptual wanderings: Wilson-Structuralism

Benedetto, Matteo De

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03374-3

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Recent work has seen both the resuscitation of operationalism (Chang, 2017;Feest, 2005Feest, , 2010Vessonen, 2021) and the development of the notion of conceptual patchworks (Bursten, 2018;De Benedetto, 2021;Haueis, 2018Haueis, , 2021aHaueis & Novick, forthcoming;Novick, 2018;Novick & Doolittle, 2021;Wilson, 2006Wilson, , 2018. This paper puts these trends in conversation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Patchworks and operations

Novick

Haueis

2023

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Recent work in the philosophy of scientific concepts has seen the simultaneous revival of operationalism and development of patchwork approaches to scientific concepts. We argue that these two approaches are natural allies. Both recognize an important role for measurement techniques in giving meaning to scientific terms. The association of multiple techniques with a single term, however, raises the threat of proliferating concepts (Hempel, 1966). While contemporary operationalists have developed some resources to address this challenge, these resources are inadequate to account for the full range of complex behaviors of scientific concepts. We adopt show how the patchwork approach’s repertoire of inter-patch relations can expand the resources available to the operationalist. We focus on one especially important type of inter-patch relation: sharing a general reasoning strategy. General reasoning strategies serve two important functions: (1) they bind together distinct patches of scientific concepts, and (2) they provide normative guidance for extending concepts to new domains.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Patchworks and operations

Novick

Haueis

2023

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…Recent work highlights the complexity of important scientific concepts (Brigandt 2003a, 2003b; Jamniczky 2005; Griffiths and Stotz 2013; Bursten 2018; Haueis 2018, 2021a; Novick 2018). Some regard conceptual complexity as a problem to be resolved by conceptual fragmentation (Ereshefsky 1992, 2010; Machery 2009; Taylor and Vickers 2017); others defend it as valuable for scientific reasoning and communication (Wilson 2006, 2018; Neto 2020; De Benedetto 2021; Haueis 2021b). But, whether friend or foe to conceptual complexity, all share a basic “adaptationist” presupposition: Conceptual complexity should be tolerated, if at all, only if it serves some valuable function.…”

Section: The Onion Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Pluralists (e.g., Brigandt 2003b; Jamniczky 2005; Currie 2016; Neto 2019) and patchwork theorists (e.g., Wilson 2006; De Benedetto 2021; Haueis 2021b) show greater appreciation for messiness. This appreciation, however, rests on the belief that there is greater order within the mess than meets the eye.…”

Section: Monist Hangovermentioning

confidence: 99%

The neutral theory of conceptual complexity

Novick¹

2023

Philos. sci.

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Philosophical studies of complex scientific concepts are predominantly “adaptationist”, arguing that conceptual complexity serves important purposes. This is a historical artifact. Having had to defend their views against a monist presumption favoring simpler concepts, pluralists and patchwork theorists felt compelled to show that complexity can be beneficial. This neglects an alternative possibility: that conceptual complexity is largely neutral, persisting simply because it does little harm. This paper defends the neutral theory of conceptual complexity in two forms: (a) as a plausible theory in its own right and (b) as a useful foil for adaptationist arguments.

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Patches, Patchworks, and Epsilon Terms: A Neo-Carnapian Account of Theoretical Terms in Science

De Benedetto,

La Rosa

2024

J Philos Logic

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In the last decades, scientific laws and concepts have been increasingly conceptualized as a patchwork of contextual and indeterminate entities. These patchwork constructions are sometimes claimed to be incompatible with traditional views of scientific theories and concepts, but it is difficult to assess such claims due to the informal character of these approaches. In this paper, we will show that patchwork approaches pose a new problem of theoretical terms. Specifically, we will demonstrate how a toy example of a patchwork structure might trivialize Carnap’s semantics for theoretical terms based upon epsilon calculus. However, as we will see, this new problem of theoretical terms can be given a neo-Carnapian solution, by generalizing Carnap’s account of theoretical terms in such a way that it applies also to patchwork constructions. Our neo-Carnapian approach to theoretical terms will also demonstrate that the analytic/synthetic distinction is meaningful even for patchwork structures.

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Taming conceptual wanderings: Wilson-Structuralism

Cited by 5 publications

References 28 publications

Patchworks and operations

Patchworks and operations

The neutral theory of conceptual complexity

Patches, Patchworks, and Epsilon Terms: A Neo-Carnapian Account of Theoretical Terms in Science

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