The neutral theory of conceptual complexity

Novick, Rose

doi:10.1017/psa.2023.25

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Philos. sci.

2023

DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.25

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The neutral theory of conceptual complexity

Rose Novick¹

Abstract: Philosophical studies of complex scientific concepts are predominantly “adaptationist”, arguing that conceptual complexity serves important purposes. This is a historical artifact. Having had to defend their views against a monist presumption favoring simpler concepts, pluralists and patchwork theorists felt compelled to show that complexity can be beneficial. This neglects an alternative possibility: that conceptual complexity is largely neutral, persisting simply because it does little harm. This paper defen… Show more

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2024

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Cited by 2 publications

References 45 publications

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Patches, Patchworks, and Epsilon Terms: A Neo-Carnapian Account of Theoretical Terms in Science

De Benedetto,

La Rosa

2024

J Philos Logic

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In the last decades, scientific laws and concepts have been increasingly conceptualized as a patchwork of contextual and indeterminate entities. These patchwork constructions are sometimes claimed to be incompatible with traditional views of scientific theories and concepts, but it is difficult to assess such claims due to the informal character of these approaches. In this paper, we will show that patchwork approaches pose a new problem of theoretical terms. Specifically, we will demonstrate how a toy example of a patchwork structure might trivialize Carnap’s semantics for theoretical terms based upon epsilon calculus. However, as we will see, this new problem of theoretical terms can be given a neo-Carnapian solution, by generalizing Carnap’s account of theoretical terms in such a way that it applies also to patchwork constructions. Our neo-Carnapian approach to theoretical terms will also demonstrate that the analytic/synthetic distinction is meaningful even for patchwork structures.

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Patches, Patchworks, and Epsilon Terms: A Neo-Carnapian Account of Theoretical Terms in Science

De Benedetto,

La Rosa

2024

J Philos Logic

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Research environments vis-à-vis biological environments: ontological parallels, epistemic parallax, and metaphilosophical parallelization

Fábregas-Tejeda

2024

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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In a recent development of what may be called biological philosophy of science, scholars have proposed that aligning notions of research environments with biological concepts of environment holds great promise for understanding the socio-material contexts in and through which science happens. Here, I explore the prospects and potential shortcomings of building sound research environment concepts by contrasting them with biological environment concepts. In doing so, I emphasize the importance of adhering to two central desiderata: the need to clarify what is being environed (i.e., what the counter relatum of an environment is) and what is doing the environing (i.e., what type of environmental partition is instantiated). Subsequently, I juxtapose two biological construals of environment—organismal environments and population environments—with possible articulations of what ‘research environments’ might stand for, and I maintain that each presents distinct epistemic upshots and limitations. More generally, I argue that there are two broad relations that could exist between biological and research environments: ontological parallels and ontic discordance. Finally, employing the visual metaphor of epistemic parallax, I conclude by conveying some lessons and cautionary notes arising from these comparisons and the importation of biological environment concepts into philosophy of science. While environment concepts may come with epistemic purchase, we should be careful when ontologizing them.

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The neutral theory of conceptual complexity

Cited by 2 publications

References 45 publications

Patches, Patchworks, and Epsilon Terms: A Neo-Carnapian Account of Theoretical Terms in Science

Patches, Patchworks, and Epsilon Terms: A Neo-Carnapian Account of Theoretical Terms in Science

Research environments vis-à-vis biological environments: ontological parallels, epistemic parallax, and metaphilosophical parallelization

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