Taking Risks on Behalf of Another

Abstract

A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. Introduction: Permissiveness of Rationality under RiskA growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk in the following sense. Consider a decision problem under risk: There is an agent who faces a choice between a number of different options. She values the different potential outcomes of her choice to different extents, but she does not know for sure what outcome each of the options available to her will bring about. She can, however, assign probabilities to how likely different outcomes are to come about as a consequence of the available options. Those who believe that rationality is permissive under risk grant that rational agents are free to make such risky choices in more or less riskaverse or risk-inclined ways. If rationality is permissive under risk, then the probabilities assigned to the potential outcomes, along with knowing the extent to which the agent values the outcomes do not fix how she should rationally choose.The following example illustrates this idea. Suppose you have to choose between two different medical treatments to undergo for a life-threatening condition. These treatments do not affect the quality of your life, and you moreover judge each of your remaining years

How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?

“…If charitable giving should be thought of as a collective enterprise, then we should treat the status quo as including only contingencies that exist apart from our collective intervention, and ask about the difference that our collective charitable giving will make to the (risk-weighted and ambiguity-resolved expected) good. There are again three See also the overview of views in Thoma (2023).…”

Patients, doctors and risk attitudes

“…In contrast to this suggestion, numerous studies have shown that doctors’ own risk attitudes, rather than those of their patients, affect the clinical decisions they make 46–48. Meanwhile, in a parallel body of emerging literature about making risky decisions on behalf of others, which is not specific to medical contexts, philosophers adopt a range of positions about what risk attitude ought to be adopted 24 49–56…”

“…Note that this description of risk attitudes is stated only in terms of the resultant preferences, but there is ongoing debate about exactly what sort of attitude risk attitudes are, and how to model these in theories of rational choice (see Thoma 24 for a helpful overview). I will remain neutral on these contentious matters here, as I intend for the arguments herein to apply to different conceptions and formal representations of risk attitudes.…”