How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?

Buchak, Lara

doi:10.1017/s0953820823000055

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…This is surprising, considering that MacAskill (2015) is essential and thoughtful literature for scholars researching NFPs. Executives of the world’s top NFPs maximize risk-weighted utility which is a particular type of utility in Buchak (2023) . The statistical analysis of part two is supportive for Davis (2020) regarding grassroots NFPs.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…HHI was calculated by a spreadsheet as written in "Methods". Why optimal was explained through Buchak (2023).…”

Section: Open Peer Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Buchak (2023) explains risk and ambiguity from a utilitarianism perspective. Decision making depends on whether stakeholders maximize (simple) expected utility or risk-weighted expected utility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On NFPs with high social impact that avoid concentrating on a few activities

Mizutani

2023

F1000Res

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Background: An influential piece of literature on effective altruism insists that not-for-profit organizations (NFPs) should concentrate their investments on a few activities to maximize their social return on investment (SROI) ratio. However, this creates greater risk for an NFP than building a portfolio of investments in activities. This study investigates whether it is desirable for executives and contributors of NFPs to build a portfolio rather than maximize the expected SROI ratio, and if so, how to build one. Solving these questions will help the chief financial officers (CFOs) of NFPs, who serve as their agents, fulfill their obligations to contributors, who are their principals, and will help advisors provide better services for their contributors, their clients. Methods: Data were collected from a ranking of NFPs, then non-parametric tests were performed on this ranking and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Results: The HHI are between 2013 and 2688. The results of non-parametric tests do not deny that rank and HHI are independent of each other. Most of the NFPs’ investments in activities were in accord with their core competencies. Conclusions: It was found that successful executives build portfolios. The findings of this study should be sufficiently practical in helping NFP executives and contributors decide whether to build portfolios, and if so, how.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…HHI was calculated by a spreadsheet as written in "Methods". Why optimal was explained through Buchak (2023).…”

Section: Open Peer Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On NFPs with high social impact that avoid concentrating on a few activities

Mizutani

2023

F1000Res

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On the desire to make a difference

Greaves,

Thomas,

Mogensen

et al. 2024

Philos Stud

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True benevolence is, most fundamentally, a desire that the world be better. It is natural and common, however, to frame thinking about benevolence indirectly, in terms of a desire to make a difference to how good the world is. This would be an innocuous shift if desires to make a difference were extensionally equivalent to desires that the world be better. This paper shows that at least on some common ways of making a “desire to make a difference” precise, this extensional equivalence fails. Where it fails, “difference-making preferences” run counter to the ideals of benevolence. In particular, in the context of decision making under uncertainty, coupling a “difference-making” framing in a natural way with risk aversion leads to preferences that violate stochastic dominance, and that lead to a strong form of collective defeat, from the point of view of betterness. Difference-making framings and true benevolence are not strictly mutually inconsistent, but agents seeking to implement true benevolence must take care to avoid the various pitfalls that we outline.

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Philosophical foundations for worst-case arguments

Buchak

2023

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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Certain ethical views hold that we should pay more attention, even exclusive attention, to the worst-case scenario. Prominent examples include Rawls's Difference Principle and the Precautionary Principle. These views can be anchored in formal principles of decision theory, in two different ways. On the one hand, they can rely on ambiguity-aversion: the idea that we cannot assign sharp probabilities to various scenarios, and that if we cannot assign sharp probabilities, we should decide pessimistically, as if the probabilities are unfavorable. On the other hand, they can rely on risk-avoidance: the idea that we should pay more attention to worse scenarios, even when we can assign sharp probabilities. I distinguish these two foundations. I also show how they can be modified to support versions of these views that pay more but not exclusive attention to worst-case scenarios. Finally, I argue that risk-avoidance provides a superior foundation than ambiguity-aversion for the Difference Principle and the Precautionary Principle; in particular, it correctly identifies which ethical facts should matter to those who champion these principles.

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How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?

Cited by 3 publications

References 43 publications

On NFPs with high social impact that avoid concentrating on a few activities

On NFPs with high social impact that avoid concentrating on a few activities

On the desire to make a difference

Philosophical foundations for worst-case arguments

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