2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2421265
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Systemic Risk in an Interconnected Banking System with Endogenous Asset Markets

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Cited by 16 publications
(11 citation statements)
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References 54 publications
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“…Billio et al (2012) examined the connectedness between banks, dealers, insurance companies, and hedge funds using a Granger-causality network and suggested that banks contribute more to shock transmissions than do other financial institutions. Bluhm and Krahnen (2014) employed a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets to explore the emergence of systemic risk and proposed a new macroprudential risk management approach. On the basis of the measure of the realized systemic risk beta, Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2014) ranked a firm's share of the systemic risk in the US financial system.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Billio et al (2012) examined the connectedness between banks, dealers, insurance companies, and hedge funds using a Granger-causality network and suggested that banks contribute more to shock transmissions than do other financial institutions. Bluhm and Krahnen (2014) employed a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets to explore the emergence of systemic risk and proposed a new macroprudential risk management approach. On the basis of the measure of the realized systemic risk beta, Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2014) ranked a firm's share of the systemic risk in the US financial system.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The recent financial crises have highlighted the importance to properly assess systemic risk in capital markets. In particular, both researchers and regulators realized that the financial system is actually more fragile than previously thought, because of the complexity of interconnections between financial institutions [2][3][4][5][6], resulting both from direct exposures to bilateral contracts and from indirect exposures to common assets [7][8][9][10][11]. Indeed, while interconnectedness means diversification and thus reduces individual risk, it can however increase systemic risk: financial distress can spread between institutions through such exposures and propagate over the market, leading to amplification effects like default cascades [12][13][14].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…External requirements are often set by regulators to safeguard sufficient buffers for various risks (credit risk -using both risk weighted and risk insensitive measures (i.e. leverage ratios), counterparty credit risk, or liquidity risk (Bluhm and Krahnen, 2014;Cont and Schaaning, 2016;Ellul et al, 2011;Thurner et al, 2012;Aymanns and Farmer, 2015).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%