Synchrophasor Data Correction Under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation-Based Approach

Fan, Xiaoyuan; Du, Liang; Duan, Dongliang

doi:10.1109/tsg.2017.2662688

Cited by 79 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Such a probing signal leads to a larger measurement residual, and therefore, ∆ > 2 is required. , which is not difficult to achieve, since these phase shifts are usually significant [11], [13]. Typical spoofed phase angles such as 52°, 60° and 70° are reported in [5], [8], and [9].…”

Section: Corollary 1 For Pmu Ifmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems

Zhang

Wang

Liu

2020

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to the vulnerability of civilian global positioning system (GPS) signals, the accuracy of phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be greatly compromised by GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs), which introduce phase shifts into true phase angle measurements. Focusing on simultaneous GSAs for multiple PMU locations, this paper proposes a novel identification and correction algorithm in distribution systems. A sensitivity analysis of state estimation residuals on a single GSA phase angle is firstly implemented. An identification algorithm using a probing technique is proposed to determine the locations of spoofed PMUs and the ranges of GSA phase shifts. Based on the identification results, these GSA phase shifts are determined via an estimation algorithm that minimizes the mismatch between measurements and system states. Further, with the attacked PMU data corrected, the system states are recovered. Simulations in unbalanced IEEE 34-bus and 123-bus distribution systems demonstrates the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method.Index Terms-State estimation, phasor measurement units, multiple GPS spoofing attacks, unbalanced distribution systems, attack identification and correction.

show abstract

Section: Corollary 1 For Pmu Ifmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems

Zhang

Wang

Liu

2020

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…State estimation and GPS spoofing attack identification in power networks is pursued in [24], [25]. A computationally efficient algorithm to identify an attack on at most one PMU is developed in [24].…”

Section: Literature Review and Paper Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The algorithm is also compared to one of the previous GPS spoofing identification approaches [24]. The developed algorithm can identify simultaneous attacks to more than one PMU, in contrast to [24]. Even if 20% of the PMUs are attacked, the algorithm correctly identifies the attacked PMU locations and yields an accurate state estimate, as indicated by tests on standard IEEE transmission networks.…”

Section: Literature Review and Paper Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grids to GPS Spoofing

Risbud

Gatsis

Taha

2019

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) endowed with GPS receivers are ubiquitously installed providing real-time grid visibility. A number of PMUs can cooperatively enable state estimation routines. However, GPS spoofing attacks can notably alter the PMU measurements, mislead the network operator, and drastically impact subsequent corrective control actions. Leveraging a novel measurement model that explicitly accounts for the GPS spoofing attacks, this paper formulates an optimization problem to identify the most vulnerable PMUs in the network. A greedy algorithm is developed to solve the aforementioned problem. Furthermore, the paper develops a computationally efficient alternating minimization algorithm for joint state estimation and attack reconstruction. Numerical tests on IEEE benchmark networks validate the developed methods.

show abstract

“…GPS spoofing exploits publicly available civilian GPS signals using air or cable to produce signals that initially align with the original, but slowly start increasing the power to drown the authentic signal and thereby compromising the receiver [54,127]. By introducing measurement errors in the time synchronization, the attacks induce changes in data consistency and plausibility which can be used as markers to identify the likelihood of the attack [128][129][130].…”

Section: Addressing Cyber-attacks Using Quality Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies

Sundararajan

Khan

Moghadasi

2018

J. Mod. Power Syst. Clean Energy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Synchrophasor devices guarantee situation awareness for real-time monitoring and operational visibility of the smart grid. With their widespread implementation, significant challenges have emerged, especially in communication, data quality and cybersecurity. The existing literature treats these challenges as separate problems, when in reality, they have a complex interplay. This paper conducts a comprehensive review of quality and cybersecurity challenges for synchrophasors, and identifies the interdependencies between them. It also summarizes different methods used to evaluate the dependency and surveys how quality checking methods can be used to detect potential cyberattacks. In doing so, this paper serves as a starting point for researchers entering the fields of synchrophasor data analytics and security.

show abstract

Synchrophasor Data Correction Under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation-Based Approach

Cited by 79 publications

References 19 publications

Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems

Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems

Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grids to GPS Spoofing

Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About