Synchronization Fault Cryptanalysis for Breaking A5/1

Gomułkiewicz, Marcin; Kutyłowski, Mirosław; Vierhaus, Heinrich Theodor; Wlaź, Paweł

doi:10.1007/11427186_36

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Then the Section 2 describes our first attack, based on synchronization fault assumption (the assumption is similar to those from [9]). The Section 3 presents another attack, based on weaker assumptions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fault Cryptanalysis and the Shrinking Generator

Gomułkiewicz

Kutyłowski

Wlaź

2006

Experimental Algorithms

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Abstract. We present two efficient and simple fault attacks on the shrinking generator. In a first case if the attacker can stop control generator for some small number of steps and observe the output, then with high probability he can deduce the full control sequence, and so the other input bitstream. The second method assumes that the attacker can disturb the control sequence (in an unpredictable and random way) and observe many samples of such experiments. Then he can reconstruct a certain sequence that agrees with the input sequence of the generator on a large fraction of bits.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fault Cryptanalysis and the Shrinking Generator

Gomułkiewicz

Kutyłowski

Wlaź

2006

Experimental Algorithms

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“…While the actual attack might face some practical issues [7], it can be used as a trapdoor in the cipher. This paper hopes to provide more design awareness for side channel attacks.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Together with the correct output, the faulty output yield important information about the initial state. In [7], the authors discovered that by stopping one of the LFSR of A5/1, attackers can easily compromise the device. Also in [11], the authors generalize the (Phase Shift) Attack and gave an example on the Shrinking Generator.…”

Section: Timing Analysis On Absgmentioning

confidence: 99%

Side Channel Attacks on Irregularly Decimated Generators

Loe

Khoo

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We investigate three side channel attacks on ABSG, a variant of irregularly decimated generators (IDG). The three attacks are timing analysis, phase-shift fault analysis and bit-flipping fault analysis. We also modify the attacks to non side-channel cryptanalyses, but on the assumption that the key/IV mixing is not well designed. This paper hopes to provide more understanding on actual hardware implementations of IDG as cipher components. Finally, we combine our fault analysis on ABSG with linearization attack to cryptanalze DECIM, an ESTREAM candidate cipher. We manage to reduce the attack complexity from 2 80 to 2 42.5 .

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Synchronization Fault Cryptanalysis for Breaking A5/1

Gomułkiewicz

Kutyłowski

Vierhaus

et al. 2005

Experimental and Efficient Algorithms

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Abstract. A5/1 pseudo-random bit generator, known from GSM networks, potentially might be used for different purposes, such as secret hiding during cryptographic hardware testing, stream encryption in piconets and others. The main advantages of A5/1 are low cost and a fixed output ratio. We show that a hardware implementation of A5/1 and similar constructions must be quite careful. It faces a danger of a new kind of attack, which significantly reduces possible keyspace, allowing full recovery of A5/1 internal registers' content. We use "fault analysis" strategy: we disturb the A5/1 encrypting device (namely, clocking of the LFSR registers) so it produces an incorrect keystream, and through error analysis we deduce the state of the internal registers. If a secret material is used to initialize the generator, like in GSM, this may enable recovering the secret. The attack is based on unique properties of the clocking scheme used by A5/1, which is the basic security component of this construction. The computations that have to be performed in our attack are about 100 times faster than in the cases of the previous fault-less cryptanalysis methods.

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Synchronization Fault Cryptanalysis for Breaking A5/1

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

Fault Cryptanalysis and the Shrinking Generator

Fault Cryptanalysis and the Shrinking Generator

Side Channel Attacks on Irregularly Decimated Generators

Synchronization Fault Cryptanalysis for Breaking A5/1

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