Symposia Papers: Collective Inaction and Shared Responsibility

Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals

“…I have argued elsewhere against the view that collectives can only be subject to obligations if they are agents (Wringe ). My views here have something in common with May who argues that collectives which are ‘putative agents’ are capable of having obligations. By contrast, Isaacs argues that potential agents can only have potential obligations.…”

What in the World Is Collective Responsibility?

“…A random collection might be defined as “a set of persons distinguishable by some characteristics from the set of all persons, but lacking a decision method for taking action that is distinguishable from such decision methods, if there are any, as are possessed by all persons” (Held , 471). Larry May calls these collections “loosely structured groups” (May ). For the purpose of attribution of responsibility to it, we can identify a relevant random collection of individuals by the fact that (1) each of them is in a position in which they can reasonably contribute to the realization or the prevention of a certain morally relevant outcome, that (2) only together do they have the causal power to realize or prevent a certain morally relevant outcome, and that (3) there is no other feature they share (e.g.…”

“…As the examples we have used at the beginning of this section suggest, there are two types of random collections that are candidates for attribution of moral responsibility: (1) random collections identified by collective inaction (Held ; May ) and (2) random collections that are held responsible for the aggregate behaviours of individuals (Sadler ). Let's consider them in order.…”

“…Held argues that in such a case, since it is obvious to any reasonable person what the individuals should have done to prevent the undesirable outcome (Held , 478) – namely coordinate with others to perform a certain joint action – the random collection formed by the individuals who were in a position to make their contribution is morally responsible “for failing to turn itself into an organized group capable of taking action requiring a decision” (Held , 479). In Larry May's words, the collection is morally responsible for its “collective inaction” (May ), and in Tracy Isaacs's words, the collective might be held responsible because, even if it is a merely random collection, it is a “putative,” or “potential” group agent that fails to meet a “putative collective obligation” (Isaacs , especially chapter 5; 2014).…”

E.U. Condon: Science, Religion, and the Politics of World Peace

“…For example, consider the case of bystanders on a beach who hear the screams of a drowning child, and no lifeguard is on duty. 193 Clearly, someone should step forward (take responsibility) to save the child even if no one can individually save the child. If collective action is required (for instance, to launch a boat), someone needs to step forward and lead the group in an attempt to save the child.…”