Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals

Wringe, Bill

doi:10.1111/ejop.12076

Cited by 37 publications

(36 citation statements)

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“…A number of authors have argued that individuals in some unstructured groups may be in a position to act jointly, or collectively (Collins ; Cripps , ; Held ; Lawford‐Smith ; Pettit and Schweikard ; Schwenkenbecher ; Wringe , , ). In order for joint action to be possible, most scholars agree that some minimal conditions need to be met.…”

Section: Joint Action Explainedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One argument in favor of the “primitive obligation to cooperate account” is that it appears simpler than the account proposed here, because it operates with only one kind of moral duty instead of two kinds (Wringe , 12). However, Wringe argues, whether or not the resulting theory is really simpler than one that accepts collective duties cannot be shown without seeing them both worked out in detail.…”

Section: Joint Moral Duties Defendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It makes sense, then, to consider the individual obligations to contribute as arising or resulting from the collective or joint obligation. According to Wringe, that the latter are more basic than the former is shown by the fact that the collective obligation remains the same even if the individuals who hold respective contributory duties change (Wringe , 11) . Apart from being more basic, the existence of the joint obligation explains the existence of the individual obligation, as Wringe (, 9) has argued.…”

Section: Joint Moral Duties Defendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Joint Moral Duties

Schwenkenbecher¹

2014

Midwest Studies In Philosophy

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Section: Joint Action Explainedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Joint Moral Duties Defendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Joint Moral Duties Defendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Joint Moral Duties

Schwenkenbecher¹

2014

Midwest Studies In Philosophy

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“…Many contributors to debates over the moral responsibility of collectives have explicitly rejected this condition (see, for example, Wringe ). It is important to recognize that we need not take issue with these philosophers.…”

Section: Two Conditions For Genuinely Collective Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

What in the World Is Collective Responsibility?

Giubilini

Levy

2018

Dialectica

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In this paper we analyse the notion of collective responsibility and the criteria for its application to different types of groups. We argue that most of the ways in which the notion of collective responsibility has been attributed to different types of groups actually refer to a form of responsibility that is not genuinely collective, but that boils down to some form of individual responsibility. We identify an intrinsically collective kind of responsibility and argue that it can be attributed to only one kind of group. We begin by setting two necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility, asking whether these two conditions are satisfied in the case of different types of groups that have been taken to be bearers of moral responsibility: organized groups, groups with internal bonds of solidarity, groups that program individuals to act in a certain way, random collections of individuals, and individuals engaging in joint actions. Contrary to what various authors have maintained, we argue that only in the case of individuals engaging in joint actions is attribution of a genuinely collective form of moral responsibility warranted, i.e. only groups engaging in joint action satisfy the two conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility.

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“… In other words, we believe that the right way to construe this situation is to say that father and son incur together a collective obligation to materially and non‐materially redress the harm of exploitation. We follow Bill Wringe () in understanding collective obligation as distributive (because collective obligations necessarily entail individual obligations) but not reducible to individual obligations (because collective obligations can be explanatorily prior to individual obligations, that is, some individual obligations are incurred because of the existence of a collective obligation incurred by a group the individual is a member of). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%