Joint Moral Duties

Schwenkenbecher, Anne

doi:10.1111/misp.12016

Cited by 20 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Several authors have denied that there must be collective agency before there is collective (or at least 'joint') obligation. Explicit defenders of this view include Bill Wringe (2010Wringe ( , 2014, Felix Pinkert (2014, forthcoming), Anne Schwenkenbecher (2013Schwenkenbecher ( , 2014, and David Killoren and Bekka Williams (Killoren and Williams 2013). I take the most interesting and difficult challenge to come from the cases discussed by Virginia Held (1970) and Stephanie Collins (2013), which I discuss in the next section under the label of 'mutual responsiveness'.…”

Section: What Kinds Of Groups Can Bear Obligations?mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…In such cases, clusters of individuals can act together without being coordinated by one of their number (or an external agent) (see also the beach rescue case in (Collins 2013)). Felix Pinkert and Anne Schwenkenbecher have both argued with reference to Held's case that groups of agents that are not themselves agents in their own right can yet be the bearers of obligations (Schwenkenbecher 2013(Schwenkenbecher , 2014Pinkert 2014).…”

Section: Spontaneous Coordination and Mutual Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 97%

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What ‘We’?

Lawford‐Smith

2015

Journal of Social Ontology

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The objective of this paper is to explain why certain authors -both popular and academic -are making a mistake when they attribute obligations to uncoordinated groups of persons, and to argue that it is particularly unhelpful to make this mistake given the prevalence of individuals faced with the difficult question of what morality requires of them in a situation in which there is a good they can bring about together with others, but not alone. I will defend two alternatives to attributing obligations to uncoordinated groups. The first solution has us build better people, who will coordinate their actions willingly and spontaneously when the occasion arises. The second solution has us build better groups, so that when the occasion arises, there is a framework in place for coordinating members into action.

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Section: What Kinds Of Groups Can Bear Obligations?mentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Spontaneous Coordination and Mutual Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 97%

What ‘We’?

Lawford‐Smith

2015

Journal of Social Ontology

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“… 26 In cases of joint action, a question arises about the degree of confidence an individual has that other members of group (loosely defined) will hold up their end of a joint action to accomplish some goal. 27 28 The actualist-possibilist debate addresses the degree to which other agents will carry out their end of a joint action. For an actualist, knowing that a joint action will be unsuccessful because others would not carry their share of the load, especially if an individual can do good elsewhere, is a relevant consideration in whether or not that individual ought to pursue a particular goal.…”

Section: The Value Of a Curementioning

confidence: 99%

The social value of candidate HIV cures: actualism versus possibilism

Brown

Evans

2016

J Med Ethics

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A sterilising or functional cure for HIV is a serious scientific challenge but presents a viable pathway to the eradication of HIV. Such an event would be extremely valuable in terms of relieving the burden of a terrible disease; however, a coordinated commitment to implement healthcare interventions, particularly in regions that bear the brunt of the HIV epidemic, is lacking. In this paper, we examine two strategies for evaluating candidate HIV cures, based on our beliefs about the likelihood of global implementation. We reject possibilist interpretations of social value that do not account for the likelihood that a plan to cure HIV will be followed through. We argue, instead, for an actualist ranking of options for action, which accounts for the likelihood that a cure will be low cost, scalable and easy to administer worldwide.

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“…Philosophers have spent considerable energy on analyzing small-scale cases of impromptu collective assistance among random bystanders, for instance (Aas 2015;Collins 2013Collins , 2019Goodin 2012;Held 1970;Schwenkenbecher 2014Schwenkenbecher , 2019. Conceptually even more challenging are those large-scale moral problems that we could substantially improve through distributive collective action (Schwenkenbecher 2020a)changing our day-to-day activities and adopting certain collective behavioural patterns (such as reducing household waste and plastic usage to address the problem of plastic pollution of oceans and waterways).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do

Schwenkenbecher

2020

Journal of Social Ontology

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In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.

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Joint Moral Duties

Cited by 20 publications

References 15 publications

What ‘We’?

What ‘We’?

The social value of candidate HIV cures: actualism versus possibilism

The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do

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