2020
DOI: 10.1080/0163660x.2020.1814007
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Switching Umbrellas in Berlin? The Implications of Franco-German Nuclear Cooperation

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Cited by 7 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…However, what Europeans ought to understand is that European attempts at decoupling-even in degrees-by acquiring more strategically significant capabilities would likely result in a growing bilateral European-Russian security dilemma. This is notably to be kept in mind in debates surrounding a hypothetical Eurodeterrent, extended deterrence options based on France's nuclear weapons or an even more hypothetical Franco-German Bomb (Egeland & Pélopidas, 2021;Kunz, 2020b). The same applies to the conventional capabilities Europeans would need to acquire (and be willing to use based on one single body of doctrine) in order to be considered decoupled.…”
Section: Europe In the Us-russia Security Dilemmamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, what Europeans ought to understand is that European attempts at decoupling-even in degrees-by acquiring more strategically significant capabilities would likely result in a growing bilateral European-Russian security dilemma. This is notably to be kept in mind in debates surrounding a hypothetical Eurodeterrent, extended deterrence options based on France's nuclear weapons or an even more hypothetical Franco-German Bomb (Egeland & Pélopidas, 2021;Kunz, 2020b). The same applies to the conventional capabilities Europeans would need to acquire (and be willing to use based on one single body of doctrine) in order to be considered decoupled.…”
Section: Europe In the Us-russia Security Dilemmamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…165 Likewise, Barbara Kunz observes that analysts across Europe agree that the Europeanization of the French bomb, however deªned, is "unlikely and hardly feasible." 166 The prospects of a Franco-British nuclear deterrent are even less likely. For one, it is highly improbable that French or British policymakers would be willing to sacriªce London or Paris for Tallinn or Riga.…”
Section: Illusions Of Autonomy 39mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, the renewed calls for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe came hand in hand with European disillusion with US handling of both nuclear affairs and Alliance politics under the Trump administration and the suggestions for building a greater role for French nuclear weapons in the European deterrence architecture (Kunz 2020). Such debates gained significant traction in some European countries.…”
Section: The Future Of Us Nuclear Weapons In Europementioning
confidence: 99%