Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

Kamijo, Yoshio; Nihonsugi, Tsuyoshi; Takeuchi, Ai; Funaki, Yukihiko

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002

Cited by 27 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…A number of experimental studies reported that punishing just one, the worst contributor in a game, was enough to maintain cooperation [27,[40][41][42][43][44]. These observations are consistent with the present study in which the ONE variant as well as the ALL variant is effective to promote cooperation in risk averse individuals.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

“…These observations are consistent with the present study in which the ONE variant as well as the ALL variant is effective to promote cooperation in risk averse individuals. Comparing the two variants, punishing one and punishing all, Andreoni and Gee [41] and Kamijo et al [42] suggested that punishing one is a more efficient solution to promote cooperation. In the present study, however, the ONE variant was more effective than the ALL variant only when the frequency of watching by authority was rare.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Nakamura

2019

Front. Phys.

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Third-party punishment is a common mechanism to promote cooperation in humans. Theoretical models of evolution of cooperation predict that punishment maintains cooperation if it is sufficiently frequent. On the other hand, empirical studies have found that participants frequently punishing others do not success in comparison with those not eager to punish others, suggesting that punishment is suboptimal and thus should not be frequent. That being the case, our question is what mechanism, if any, can sustain cooperation even if punishment is rare. The present study proposes that one possible mechanism is risk-averse social learning. Using the method of evolutionary game dynamics, we investigate the effect of risk attitude of individuals on the question. In our framework, individuals select a strategy based on its risk, i.e., the variance of the payoff, as well as its expected payoff; risk-averse individuals prefer to select a strategy with low variable payoff. Using the framework, we examine the evolution of cooperation in two-player social dilemma games with punishment. We study two models: cooperators and defectors compete, while defectors may be punished by an exogenous authority; and cooperators, defectors, and cooperative punishers compete, while defectors may be punished by the cooperative punishers. We find that in both models, risk-averse individuals achieve stable cooperation with significantly low frequency of punishment. We also examine three punishment variants: in each game, all defectors are punished; only one of defectors is punished; and only a defector who exploits a cooperator or a cooperative punisher is punished. We find that the first and second variants effectively promote cooperation. Comparing the first and second variants, each can be more effective than the other depending on punishment frequency.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Nakamura

2019

Front. Phys.

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“…Thus, the opportunities to form coalitions with cooperators and to ostracize free riders from one's current group based on others' reputation may more robustly promote cooperation than strategies like defecting with free riders. Moreover, punishment can be implemented in a centralized way such that people who contribute less than others, or below a threshold, pay a fine (Kamijo et al, 2014), or in a decentralized way (i.e., group members punish each other). Although centralized punishment is shown to be less effective than decentralized punishment in promoting cooperation (Balliet et al, 2011), the former may be easier to implement and can prevent anti-social punishment and retaliation.…”

Section: Strengths Limitations and Directions For Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Balliet

Peperkoorn

et al. 2020

Front. Psychol.

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Reputation and punishment are two distinct mechanisms that facilitate cooperation among strangers. However, empirical research on their effectiveness is mainly limited to relatively small groups and does not address how they enhance cooperation in relatively larger groups. We address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses from competing perspectives about the extent to which reputation-based partner choice and punishment enhance cooperation in both small and large groups. Prior work recognizes that an increase in group size is accompanied by a change in the incentive structure, which determines whether the temptation (extra benefit for each person from noncooperation over cooperation, regardless of others' choices) or gain (extra benefit for each person from full cooperation over full non-cooperation) remains constant or varies with group size. Thus, we first test how group size affects cooperation when temptation or gain increases with group size (Study 1), and then move on to testing predictions on the effectiveness of reputation and punishment across different group sizes (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 820), we randomly assigned participants to play an online one-shot public goods game in groups of 4, 20, or 40, while keeping the marginal group return or marginal per capita return fixed across groups, in which case the temptation or gain increased with group size. In Study 2 (N = 1,132), we further compared a public goods situation involving a punishment or reputation mechanism with an anonymous situation across group sizes, while the marginal group return was fixed across groups. Overall, we found that when temptation increased with group size, 20-person groups cooperated significantly less than 4-person groups in one-shot interactions, and that this effect was explained by lower expectation of others' cooperation, less perceived collective efficacy, and greater perceived conflict. However, 40-person and 4-person groups did not vary in one-shot cooperation. Importantly, reputation-based partner choice and punishment invariably promoted one-shot cooperation in groups of different sizes. These findings suggest no simple effect of group size on cooperation and underscore the utility of reputation and punishment in fostering cooperation (at least in one-shot interactions) regardless of the size of groups.

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“…Other authors relate a decline in cooperation in repeated games to other-regarding preferences (Houser and Kurzban, 2002, Goeree et al, 2002, Brandts and Schram, 2001, Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997, Fischbacher et al, 2001). 3 See Andreoni and Gee, 2012, Boyd et al, 2010, Cheung, 2014, De Silva et al, 2010, Dickson et al, 2015, Faillo et al, 2013, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Herrmann et al, 2008, Kamei, 2014, Kamijo et al, 2014, Nosenzo and Sefton, 2012, OGorman et al, 2009, Schoenmakers et al, 2014. For an overview see Chaudhuri, 2010, Balliet et al, 2011 changes conditional cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditional cooperation and the effect of punishment

Kirchkamp

Mill

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We study how punishment influences conditional cooperation. We ask two questions: 1) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject can be punished and 2) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject has the power to punish others. In particular, we disentangle the decision to be a conditional cooperator at all from the strength of conditional cooperation. We find that the possibility of being punished increases the strength of conditional cooperation. At the same time the possibility of being punished increases the number of free riders. In our study the net effect on cooperation still is positive. The possibility of punishing others has two effects: Substitution and responsibility. Players substitute conditional cooperation with punishment which leads to a decrease in conditional cooperation. The power to punish means more responsibility which leads to an increase in conditional cooperation. In our design the overall effect of responsibility is stronger than the effect of substitution. We conclude that the threat of being punished and the power to punish changes conditional cooperation behavior in several, unexpected, ways.

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Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

Cited by 27 publications

References 29 publications

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Conditional cooperation and the effect of punishment

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