Sustainability of photovoltaic poverty alleviation in China: An evolutionary game between stakeholders

Shan, Haiyan; Yang, Junliang

doi:10.1016/j.energy.2019.05.152

Cited by 94 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…There have been a great number of studies that use the evolutionary game theory to explain the evolution of cooperative behaviors, such as dynamic networks (Fu et al, 2007;Melamed and Simpson, 2016;Raub et al, 2013;Rezaei and Kirley, 2012), and preferential selection (Deng et al, 2016;Shi et al, 2009). The behavior patterns in practical decision-making activities such as PV poverty alleviation projects are very close to this research framework (Shan and Yang, 2019) in that parties need to repeat the game, and finally show a dynamic stable state.…”

Section: A Government-enterprise-household Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…The decision tree is shown in Figure 2. We obtained the parameters from the literature such as Shan and Yang (2019) and Zhang et al (2018a) and calibrated them through interviews of all the three stakeholders. We interviewed ten government officials, eight companies' managers and several households participating in the PV poverty alleviation projects.…”

Section: Model Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program

Zhang

Shi

2019

Energy Policy

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Poverty reduction and access to clean energy are two challenges highlighted in the UN Sustainable Development Goals. China's Photovoltaic (PV) Poverty Reduction Program provides an archetype model to address those two questions simultaneously. Using a tripartite game of government, enterprise and household, this paper examines the challenges that have impeded the development of China's PV poverty alleviation program. Based on an evolutionary game model and the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) model involving the three major parties, this study shows that: (1) Governmental monitoring and the active participation of both enterprises and households are essential to achieve a win-win-win outcome; (2) The government plays a leading role in monitoring and encouraging the active participation of enterprises and households and resolving the conflicts between enterprises and households; and (3) Households should have a minimum share in the project. The analyses imply the following policy suggestions such as ensuring optimal path selection for all parties, avoiding the abandonment of projects, increasing households' sense of ownership and creating accessible finance.

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Section: A Government-enterprise-household Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Model Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program

Zhang

Shi

2019

Energy Policy

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“…Evolutionary game theory has been a powerful method for demonstrating the evolution of cooperation which is widely used to analyze cooperative relationships between stakeholders [ 39 ]. Different from static game, the evolutionary game model considers the rational degree of stakeholders [ 40 ]. Kai et al analyzed the low-carbon strategic choice of supply chain enterprises by evolutionary game theory [ 41 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factors Influencing Private Hospitals’ Participation in the Innovation of Biomedical Engineering Industry: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Liu

Yang

2020

IJERPH

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The innovation of the biomedical engineering (BME) industry is inseparable from its cooperation with medical institutions. China has considerable medical institutions. Although private hospitals account for more than half of Chinese medical institutions, they rarely participate in biomedical engineering industry innovation. This paper analyzed the collaborative relationship among biomedical engineering enterprises, universities, research institutes, public hospitals and private hospitals through evolutionary game theory and discussed the influence of different factors on the collaborative innovation among them. A tripartite evolutionary game model is established which regards private hospitals as a stakeholder. The results show that (1) the good credit of private hospitals has a positive effect on their participation in collaborative innovation; (2) it is helpful for BME collaborative innovation to enhance the collaborative innovation ability of partners; (3) the novelty of innovation projects has an impact on BME collaborative innovation. The specific impacts depend on the revenue, cost and risk allocation ratio of innovation partners; (4) the higher the practicability of innovation projects, the more conducive to collaborative innovation.

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“…As a new game theory research method, evolutionary game theory combines traditional game theory with animal evolution theory to analyze the game behavior of different participants . In recent years, evolutionary games are widely used in multiple fields, such as low‐carbon supply chain, photovoltaic poverty alleviation, public–private partnership reconstruction of buildings, environmental pollution, and collaborative carbon emission reduction . However, the evolutionary game theory was rarely used in energy storage field.…”

Section: Energy Storage Policy and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on promotion incentive policy and mechanism simulation model of energy storage technology

Wang

Tan

et al. 2019

Energy Science & Engineering

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With the promulgation and implementation of a large number of renewable energy policies in China, the rapid development of renewable energy is accompanied by the prominent phenomenon of renewable energy abandoning wind and light. Energy storage technology is the key technology to promote the consumption of renewable energy. The government can promote the energy storage technology through the incentive policy of energy storage industry. Firstly, content analysis method is used to analyze China's energy storage policy, and five incentive policies for promoting energy storage technology are obtained. Secondly, built a game model of energy storage technology promotion based on the evolutionary game theory. Finally, use MATLAB software for numerical simulation. Numerical simulation results show that: (a) When the local government chooses to promote less, energy enterprises will eventually adopt the nonconfigure strategy; (b) when the local government chooses to promote more vigorously, energy enterprises will finally adopt the configure strategy; (c) increase in the total electricity sold by energy enterprises with energy storage devices, the sales price of energy stored per unit, the compensation price of energy stored per unit, tax relief standards, and incentive costs of local governments can promote energy enterprises to choose configure strategies; and (d) the reduction of unit energy storage cost, configure cost, and comprehensive tax rate can promote energy enterprises to choose configure strategy.

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Sustainability of photovoltaic poverty alleviation in China: An evolutionary game between stakeholders

Cited by 94 publications

References 46 publications

Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program

Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program

Factors Influencing Private Hospitals’ Participation in the Innovation of Biomedical Engineering Industry: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Research on promotion incentive policy and mechanism simulation model of energy storage technology

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