“…Canadian feathers were ruffled when in 2009 the new Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, seemed to equate the northern border with the southern border and called for a policy review on the Canada-US line. "The 'Mexicanization' of the 49 th parallel," would be one of Canada's worst policy nightmares (as quoted in Anderson 2006, 3; see also Sokolsky andLagassé 2005/2006, 24).…”
Section: Implications Of Spp For Canadian-american Relationsmentioning
The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) launched in 2005 by the three countries of North America presents an important case study in North American cooperation in the decade after the 9/11 attacks. The pro-integration arguments advanced by think tanks and the business community overplayed the pragmatic agenda of the governments. The SPP was unpopular and without legislative support in Canada and the United States. By 2009, the annual summit of leaders was the only survivor of the SPP initiative. The SPP process produced modest results for Canada and points to the need for a broader and more inclusive approach in terms of consultation. It also confirmed the Canadian view that a trilateral approach does not deliver on Canadian interests. If the Obama administration does not relaunch a rebranded SPP, the final lesson of the SPP experience would be a setback for the pro-integration approach in North America.
“…Canadian feathers were ruffled when in 2009 the new Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, seemed to equate the northern border with the southern border and called for a policy review on the Canada-US line. "The 'Mexicanization' of the 49 th parallel," would be one of Canada's worst policy nightmares (as quoted in Anderson 2006, 3; see also Sokolsky andLagassé 2005/2006, 24).…”
Section: Implications Of Spp For Canadian-american Relationsmentioning
The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) launched in 2005 by the three countries of North America presents an important case study in North American cooperation in the decade after the 9/11 attacks. The pro-integration arguments advanced by think tanks and the business community overplayed the pragmatic agenda of the governments. The SPP was unpopular and without legislative support in Canada and the United States. By 2009, the annual summit of leaders was the only survivor of the SPP initiative. The SPP process produced modest results for Canada and points to the need for a broader and more inclusive approach in terms of consultation. It also confirmed the Canadian view that a trilateral approach does not deliver on Canadian interests. If the Obama administration does not relaunch a rebranded SPP, the final lesson of the SPP experience would be a setback for the pro-integration approach in North America.
“…Instead, the overriding concern was whether the US perceived Canada to be lax on security, which could cause severe “collateral damage” to Canadian economic security (Whitaker : 45; Fortmann and Haglund : 21). As Sokolsky and Lagassé argue, “The Canadian nightmare is not so much a terrorist attack on Canada… Rather the nightmare is what would happen to the bilateral relationship and the Canada‐US border if a terrorist strike against America emanates from Canada” (Sokolsky and Lagassé : 17).…”
Section: Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That Canada was seen as a threat by many American policymakers (due to a persistent but erroneous belief that the 9/11 hijackers entered the US via Canada) posed considerable problems for policymakers in Ottawa. Canadian policymakers did not only have to worry about 9/11, but 9/12, “when American panic closed the U.S. border and shook our prosperity to its very core” (cited in Sokolsky and Lagassé : 17). Some describe this idea as the Canadian border becoming “Mexicanized”: a situation where Americans begin to view their northern border through the same security lens as their southern one and implement tougher border policies (Fortmann and Haglund :21; see also Andreas : 6; Sokolsky and Lagassé : 24).Hypothesis 2 (H 2 ): Canadian security policy is driven by a need to be “separate but cooperative”…”
Section: Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The need to respond to the above dilemma is often framed in terms of the imperative for Canada to be “separate but cooperative” in relation to the US (Sokolsky and Lagassé ). The cooperative part is paramount: as noted above, “The strong and quick reaction of the United States to 9/11 probably had a bigger impact on Canada than 9/11 itself” (Paquin ).…”
Literature on Canada‐United States (US) counter‐terrorism (CT) cooperation from the early 2000s presumed that Canadian CT policy was driven by US security imperatives and fear, leaving little room for Canada to develop its own path in fighting terrorism. It presumed that: the Canadian government was more worried about the US reaction to terrorism than terrorism itself; Canadian security policy sought to be “separate but cooperative”; and Canadian policy was informed by “wise” understandings of the US. We argue these assumptions no longer hold. Since 2011, with the rise of the Islamic State and foreign fighter activity, the Canadian government took independent steps to address national security concerns in a multilateral environment. We use process tracing to track evolutions in the Passenger Protect Program (Canada's “no‐fly list” policy), showing how Canada has increasingly asserted agency in response to violent extremism. It suggests the prior scholarly consensus on the US role in Canadian CT policy must be rethought.
This paper examines the role of identity in shaping counter-terrorism policy in Canada. We show that identity functions in three ways: constitutively by defining the range of choices a state is likely to consider; strategically by being a resource to buttress arguments based in economic or sovereignty; and heuristically by using identity as a marker for risk. This three-faceted explanation helps explain why, despite close economic, social, and political links between Canada and the United States which might lead us to expect Canada to follow American counter-terrorism policy, Canadian counter-terrorism policy often diverges from the American lead.
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