Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: U.S.-Canada Relations and Counter-terrorism Policy

Abstract

This paper examines the role of identity in shaping counter-terrorism policy in Canada. We show that identity functions in three ways: constitutively by defining the range of choices a state is likely to consider; strategically by being a resource to buttress arguments based in economic or sovereignty; and heuristically by using identity as a marker for risk. This three-faceted explanation helps explain why, despite close economic, social, and political links between Canada and the United States which might lead us to expect Canada to follow American counter-terrorism policy, Canadian counter-terrorism policy often diverges from the American lead.

Made in Canada: The evolution of Canadian counter‐terrorism policy in the post‐9/11 world

“…In addition to avoiding the bad optics of allowing the US to dictate who could fly between Canadian cities, the eventual Canadian no‐fly list that would be applied under the PPP involved more precise criteria for listing than its notoriously expansive US counterpart: only those individuals deemed to pose an “immediate threat” to civil aviation could be listed. As a result, “Canada’s list is orders of magnitude smaller than the U.S. list (reportedly between 500 and 3000 versus over a million)" (Kitchen and Sasikumar : 167). Although the PPP was distinctly “separate” from the SFP, it was sufficiently “cooperative” to secure an exemption for Canada‐to‐Canada flights crossing into American airspace, when the SFP was ultimately approved and implemented.…”

“…First, is the so‐called “Kingston Dispensation of 1938,” which refers to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s promise that the US “would not stand idly by” if Canada were to be threatened or attacked. At the same time, Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King promised that Canada would not do anything to put US security at risk or to jeopardize its territorial security (Kitchen and Sasikumar : 158; see also Fortmann and Haglund : 17‐18; Nossal, Roussel and Paquin : 27‐29). Second, paradoxically, is the idea of “defence against help” (Ørvik ).…”

“…Second, paradoxically, is the idea of “defence against help” (Ørvik ). This is a set of “sovereignty concerns related to Canadian fears of Americans taking Canadian security into their own hands, either by implementing policies that are contrary to Canadian interests, or more seriously, by enforcing American laws on Canadian territory” (Kitchen and Sasikumar : 158). For Kitchen and Sasikumar, in the context of 9/11, “defence against help” implies “that Canada must always consider American security imperatives while defending its sovereign right to develop its own policies against terrorism” (Kitchen and Sasikumar : 158).…”

“…Those who argue that Canada has been successful in being “separate but cooperative” note that policymakers were able to strategically wield Canadian identity to highlight “sameness” with the US in order to assuage American fears. Kitchen and Sasikumar note this facilitated special treatment for Canada under the American “Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative” (WHTI) program (Kitchen and Sasikumar : 164‐5 and 168). Others note that Canada was able to manage “asymmetric security cooperation” with the US by deploying strategies that could overcome the disadvantage of being a weaker partner.…”

“…As Sokolsky and Lagassé put it, “Ottawa has found a way to adjust to the realities of American power since 9/11. As a result, the Canada‐US security relationship flourished at a time when the American people felt most vulnerable” (Sokolsky and Lagassé : 23; Kitchen and Sasikumar : 161).…”