Surveillance and control of SARS‐CoV‐2 in mustelids: An evolutionary perspective

Abstract

The relevance of mustelids in SARS‐CoV‐2 transmission has become increasingly evident. Alongside experimental demonstration of airborne transmission among ferrets, the major animal model for human respiratory diseases, transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2 within‐ and/or between‐commercial mink farms has occurred and continues to occur. The number of mink reared for the luxury fur trade is approximately 60.5 million, across 36 mustelid‐farming countries. By July 2021, SARS‐CoV‐2 outbreaks have been reported in 12 of these countries, at 412 European and 20 North American mink farms. Reverse zoonotic transmission events (from humans to mink) have introduced the virus to farms with subsequent extensive mink‐to‐mink transmission as well as further zoonotic (mink‐to‐human) transmission events generating cases among both farm workers and the broader community. Overcrowded housing conditions inherent within intensive mink farms, often combined with poor sanitation and welfare, both guarantee spread of SARS‐CoV‐2 and facilitate opportunities for viral variants, thereby effectively representing biotic hubs for viral transmission and evolution of virulence. Adequate preventative, surveillance and control measures within the mink industry are imperative both for the control of the current global pandemic and to mitigate against future outbreaks.

Evolution of ACE2-independent SARS-CoV-2 infection and mouse adaption after passage in cells expressing human and mouse ACE2

“…As infection of wild animals by SARS-CoV-2 is increasingly being reported ( Chandler et al. 2021 ; Diaz, Walker, and Webster 2021 ; Griffin et al. 2021 ; Langereis et al.…”

Transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2 Delta variant (B.1.617.2) from a fully vaccinated human to a canine in Georgia, July 2021

“…Currently, there is no evidence that animals play a significant role in spreading SARS‐CoV‐2 to people (CDC, 2021a ). However, if emerging variants continue to become more transmissible, SARS‐CoV‐2‐susceptible animal species will remain a risk for animal reservoirs, spillback infections to humans and development of species‐specific mutations or variants (Díaz et al., 2021 ), despite increasing COVID‐19 vaccination rates in humans. Active surveillance for SARS‐CoV‐2 in susceptible animal species (including companion animals that have close and frequent contact with people) and subsequent genomic comparative analysis, along with additional experimental research, are needed to further characterize infections and determine putative evolving roles in transmission considering novel SARS‐CoV‐2 variants with differing viral kinetics and host dynamics.…”

Zoonose e zoonose reversa do SARS-CoV-2 sob a perspectiva da Saúde Única

“…Os surtos em fazendas de criação de visons foram facilitados pelo acúmulo de gaiolas adjacentes. Essas instalações permitem tanto o livre fluxo de ar quanto o contato com animais dentro de instalações com alta densidade de indivíduos, que conjugadas a condições higiênicas precárias e fatores de estresse decorrentes da superpopulação de visons, propiciaram a disseminação do SARS-CoV-2 e criaram oportunidades para variantes virais (Díaz et al, 2021). Zoológicos podem possuir as mesmas condicionantes de fazendas de criação de animais, e a maior circulação de visitantes e tratadores pode refletir em um maior número de eventos de transmissão de humanos para animais estratégia experimental utilizada para controlar a raiva na vida selvagem.…”