Supporters and opposition in authoritarian legislatures

Simison, Emilia

doi:10.1080/13572334.2020.1847375

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…There are also good reasons to believe that dynamics in Russia are representative of other competitive authoritarian regimes around the world. Nearly 50% of authoritarian states had multiple parties represented in their legislatures (Simison 2022). Russia in that sense is no outlier.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

SZAKONYI

2024

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Do corrupt officials govern differently in elected office? This article develops a theoretical framework and analyzes new data from financial disclosures to estimate the governing costs of corruption. First, I uncover substantial hidden wealth held by roughly one quarter of the legislators in the Russian Duma; these “kompromat deputies” are vulnerable to damaging information being used against them by the regime. Analyzing their behavior in office, I find that these deputies are less active and more absent members of parliament. When called to vote, kompromat deputies from the opposition also more eagerly support the regime’s political agenda. Finally, kompromat deputies are less likely to win reelection, suggesting that they have shorter time horizons as well as that parties have incentives to rotate them out. Autocrats permit and then monitor corruption in order to co-opt potential challengers, who in turn trade loyalty to the regime in exchange for opportunities to self-enrich.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

SZAKONYI

2024

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…For example, a recent study by Emilia Simison looks into the legislative process in the Brazilian Congress during the last dictatorship (1964–85). While the patterns observed do not amount to anything like a full-blown opposition mode in parliamentary democracies, Simison's findings clearly suggest that the government or opposition status of legislators matters, with pro-government and opposition legislators behaving differently, and focusing on different areas when introducing bills (Simison 2022). According to a study by Felix Wiebrecht (2021) which uses a large-N cross-sectional research design (1946–2000), the existence of an opposition is conducive to more de jure and de facto powers of authoritarian legislatures; however, importantly, the oppositions’ electoral strength is not linked to legislative strength.…”

Section: Party-based Opposition In Competitive Autocraciesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Political Oppositions in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes: A State-of-the-Field(s) Review

Helms

2022

Gov. & oppos.

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Political opposition has long been one of the most dramatically understudied elements of real-world politics in contemporary democratic and authoritarian regimes. The past decade or so has, however, witnessed an upsurge of new opposition research that begs for a major state-of-the-field review. Interestingly, recent scholarship has focused more on manifestations of opposition in authoritarian and hybrid than in democratic systems, which indicates a latent reconceptualization of political opposition (setting aside older distinctions between regime-loyal opposition and regime-challenging forms of resistance, dissidence and contestation). With a focus on party-based forms of opposition, which have been widely considered to mark the most effective form of opposition, this review article takes stock and highlights key issues for future research as well as some inherent obstacles to the emergence of a more integrated field of cross-regime opposition studies.

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“…In order to explain delegates’ activity in authoritarian assemblies, scholars followed the theoretical premise of cooptation theory (Desposato 2001; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Simison 2020). Although it is primarily concerned with why dictators would establish institutions in the first place, cooptation theory also offers insights on how delegates might behave in assemblies.…”

Section: Core Elites Peripheral Elites and Activity In Authoritarian ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regime insiders, however, do not need the additional opportunities of assemblies since they are key decision-makers or have closer links with them to begin with. Prior studies that followed the cooptation approach focused often primarily on electoral cooptation mechanisms (Desposato 2001; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Simison 2020).…”

Section: Core Elites Peripheral Elites and Activity In Authoritarian ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior research on delegates in authoritarian assemblies has highlighted that financial rewards can explain why someone would want to become a member of parliament but does not go into detail in explaining delegates’ activity once they are part of the legislature (Blaydes 2011; Truex 2014). Other research, inspired by cooptation theory, more explicitly focuses on the question of delegates’ activity (Desposato 2001; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Krol 2020; Simison 2020). These studies often primarily focus on electoral cooptation mechanisms and, as a result, can relatively clearly distinguish between regime insiders and outsiders.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Explaining Activity in Authoritarian Assemblies: Evidence from China

Wiebrecht

2022

J. East Asian Stud.

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Who attempts to influence policymaking through authoritarian assemblies and why are some delegates considerably more active in doing so than others? Drawing on original data from provincial People's Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs) in China, this study adopts a delegate-centered perspective and develops a theory of delegates’ activity in authoritarian assemblies. It argues that delegates’ activity can be explained by a combination of both cooptation theory and an understanding of delegates’ position within the authoritarian regime and hierarchy. The results highlight that core elites with more direct means of influencing policymaking will forego assemblies. Yet, peripheral elites lack other institutional channels of access to decision-makers and have to voice their demands in authoritarian legislatures. This study highlights the need for disaggregating groups of actors in authoritarian politics and offers an alternative view of cooptation particularly relevant for closed authoritarian regimes.

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Supporters and opposition in authoritarian legislatures

Cited by 7 publications

References 31 publications

Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Political Oppositions in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes: A State-of-the-Field(s) Review

Explaining Activity in Authoritarian Assemblies: Evidence from China

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