Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination

Lewis, Tracy R.; Sappington, David E. M.

doi:10.2307/2527055

Cited by 320 publications

(192 citation statements)

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“…They study a situation in which two sellers compete for a single buyer who observes a private signal on the relative quality of their goods. As in Lewis and Sappington (1994) and in the present paper, theȳ nd that sellers may lose from the release of public information. Our paper di®ers from Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) in that we focus on the imperfect competition on the demand side in an auction framework and we allow the seller to control the extent of buyers' private information.…”

supporting

confidence: 67%

“…Most of their results are extreme, in the sense that the monopolist decides to provide either all the information or none. Aside from the di®erences in the information structures analyzed, our paper di®ers from Lewis and Sappington (1994) in that the price is set by an auction mechanism. Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) obtain similar results to Lewis and Sappington (1994) in an oligopolistic environment.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Aside from the di®erences in the information structures analyzed, our paper di®ers from Lewis and Sappington (1994) in that the price is set by an auction mechanism. Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) obtain similar results to Lewis and Sappington (1994) in an oligopolistic environment. They study a situation in which two sellers compete for a single buyer who observes a private signal on the relative quality of their goods.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead it is distributed on the circle according to a 8 That is, as ± goes to in¯nity, the probability that " will be equal to zero converges to 1. 9 The truncated normal distribution de¯ned on the interval [¡ , is an example of a distribution that is consistent with these three assumptions.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations

Ganuza¹

2004

The RAND Journal of Economics

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We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object to one of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. The auctioneer does not know bidders' preferences but has private information about the characteristics of the object, and must decide how much information to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneer has incentives to release less information than would be e±cient and that the amount of information released increases with the level of competition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the e±cient level of information.

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confidence: 67%

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confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations

Ganuza¹

2004

The RAND Journal of Economics

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“…Lewis and Sappington (1994), Schlee (1996) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) consider a seller that allows buyers to acquire private information about their value for an item prior to purchase. Villas-Boas (2004) considers the interaction of informative advertising that communicates a product's existence with a monopolist's choice of product line offerings.…”

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confidence: 99%

Demonstrations and Price Competition in New Product Release

Boleslavsky

Cotton

2017

Management Science

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. We incorporate product demonstrations into a game theoretic model of firm price competition. Demonstrations may include product samples, trials, return policies, reviews, or any other means by which a firm allows consumers to learn about their value for a new product. In our model, demonstrations help individual consumers learn whether they prefer an innovation over an established product. The innovative firm controls demonstration informativeness. When prices can respond to demonstration policies, the firm prefers to provide maximumly informative demonstrations, which optimally segment the market, dampen subsequent price competition, and maximize profits. In contrast, when prices are less flexible, the firm prefers only partially informative demonstrations, designed to maximize its market share at prevailing prices. Such a strategy can generate the monopoly profit for the innovative firm. We contrast the strategic role of demonstrations in our framework with the strategic role of capacity limits in models of judo economics (e.g. Gelman and Salop 1983), which also allow firms to divide a market and reduce competition. Terms of use: Documents inDate: Current version: July 2015.

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Spatial aspects of ticket scalping

Goff

Tollison

2010

Manage. Decis. Econ.

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We develop a simple insurance model of the secondary market for tickets to account for some of the observed spatial patterns of prices. Beyond ticket markets the model draws attention to the existence of subtle insurance fees in market prices that may be incorrectly attributed to breakdown of the law of one price or attributed solely to a cost-based rationale. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination

Cited by 320 publications

References 16 publications

Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations

Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations

Demonstrations and Price Competition in New Product Release

Spatial aspects of ticket scalping

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