This article considers two tourism supply chains (TSCs). Each TSC is assumed to consist of three sectors with the following service providers -a theme park operator, accommodation providers, and tour operators. Game theory is used to investigate the cooperation and competition between these two TSCs, between the three sectors within each TSC and between the enterprises within each sector when configuring and marketing package holidays. Two research questions are of particular interest: (1) How do the tour operators and accommodation providers determine the optimal number of tourists they served, and how does the theme park optimize its admission prices? (2) How do the factors like supply chain membership, supply chain preference and strategic integration affect supply chain members' decisions, as well as their performances? Several important findings are obtained. First, a larger membership in each of the TSC sectors strengthens the sector's overall capacity and intensifies the internal competition, thus reducing members' profits while other sectors benefit from this internal competition.Second, decision-makers of the two competing TSCs should adopt appropriate product differentiation strategies by carefully positioning their package holiday products in order to optimize their performance. Third, the theme park would benefit from integration with the accommodation provider. There exists a win-win situation in which the performances of both TSCs could be improved, if the integration adequately increases the TSCs' preference.Competition Dynamics of Tourism Supply Chains 3