Cooperative Evolutionary Game and Applications in Construction Supplier Tendency

Shi, Qianqian; Zhu, Jianbo; Li, Qian

doi:10.1155/2018/8401813

Cited by 34 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Wei He [15] constructed a model based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, which incorporates several main factors influencing the development of modular production network. Qianqian Shi [16] developed an evolutionary game model to explore the cooperation tendency of multiple suppliers gaining a deeper insight into the suppliers' cooperative relationships. Chengrong Pan [17] employed the evolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperation between the microgrid and conventional grid, with the discussion focusing on the factors that influence the game players' selection of strategies, and additionally made a numerical simulation analysis.…”

Section: Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military‐Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

Fang

Chan

2019

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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The military-civilian collaborative innovation is an implementation path for most countries to develop strategic emerging industries. The satellite industry is an important area in strategic emerging industries. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we build an evolutionary game model of China's satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation with military enterprises and civil enterprises as the main participators under the bounded rationality. Then we analyze the long-term evolution of the system and the factors influencing cooperative stability and perform numerical simulation using Matlab. Our research shows that the cooperative stability of China's satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation is positively related to the cooperation revenue, liquidated damages, and government incentives and negatively related to basic income, R&D costs, information communication costs, technology secondary conversion costs, risk costs, and betrayal income. The reasonable income distribution coefficient is conducive to the cooperative stability, and we give a primary standard for government incentives. Finally, corresponding management implications are put forward.

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Section: Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military‐Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

Fang

Chan

2019

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…Requejo and Camacho [54] also studied the evolution of cooperative behavior under finite resources by combining a resource-based model with evolutionary game theory. Shi [55] and Zhu [56] studied multi-supplier cooperation and competition during the prefabricated production of key components for mega projects using an evolutionary perspective.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

et al. 2018

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The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.

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“…Time optimization has therefore always been an important issue in the field of construction project management [1,2]. For owners, a reasonable compression of the construction period on the basis of ensuring the quality of the project can make sure they are put into operation as soon as possible and thus increase operating revenues and social benefits [3,4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences

Meng

et al. 2019

Complexity

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Construction time optimization is affected greatly by the negotiation between owners and contractors, whose progress is dictated by their desire to maximize system revenues. This paper builds an agent-based model and designs an experimental scenario in which the contractor has competitive and social welfare preferences relevant to the Chinese context; we subdivide competitive preference into greed and jealousy components and subdivide social welfare preference into generosity and sympathy components. We analyze the impacts of these different contractor preferences on the revenue-sharing coefficient, negotiation success rate, and negotiation time when negotiation reaches agreement. The results show that the jealousy component of competitive preference has an important influence on improving the income of the subject, while the greed component does not significantly enhance the revenue-sharing coefficient. The sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on the revenue-sharing coefficient no matter the strength of the generosity component. Increasing the greed component of competitive preference will lead to the extension of negotiation time and, to a certain extent, to the reduction of the negotiation success rate; the sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on negotiation time no matter the strength of the generosity preference.

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Cooperative Evolutionary Game and Applications in Construction Supplier Tendency

Cited by 34 publications

References 45 publications

The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military‐Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military‐Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences

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