Supply chain coordination under discrete information asymmetries and quantity discounts

Zissis, Dimitris; Ioannou, George; Burnetas, Apostolos

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2014.11.007

Cited by 74 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 39 publications

(45 reference statements)

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“…The coordination aims to provide accurate information and incentive for supply members by applying certain contracts. In general, the basic supply chain contract includes a sharing revenue contract [27][28][29][30][31], a buy-back contract [32][33][34], a quantity discount contract [35][36][37], a wholesale pricing contract [38][39][40], and a quantity-flexibility contract [41,42]. Alongside these, some special contracts have also been designed to coordinate the supply chain.…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Han

Wang

2018

Sustainability

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At present, online shopping is becoming increasingly popular. In particular, low-carbon products are becoming more favored as consumers' low-carbon awareness increases. Manufacturers sell their low-carbon products through e-commerce platforms. Thus, the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform form a low-carbon e-supply chain system. The manufacturer makes products with carbon emission reduction efforts, while the e-commerce platform provides a sales service. In this paper, we described models for a decentralized decision mode and a centralized decision mode in the low-carbon e-supply chain, and compare the decision results. Our findings show that the centralized decision mode has a better performance than the decentralized one, the ability of the e-supply chain to respond to consumers' preference for a low-carbon product has a direct effect on its operation, and the manufacturer's carbon emission reduction behavior will be a potential source for enterprises to gain more revenue. Further, we designed a coordination contract for them that can be accepted by both sides in the decentralized decision mode. We find that if the e-commerce platform can share the carbon emission reduction costs of the manufacturer, the performance of the e-supply chain will be greatly improved. A practical case study and numerical examples validate our analysis.

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Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Han

Wang

2018

Sustainability

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“…Another model similar to ours is discussed in Zissis et al 2015, but there are only two retailer types. Furthermore, the supplier has no holding costs, which reduces the number of optimal menus of contracts that can occur.…”

Section: Connection To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Two-echelon supply chain coordination under information asymmetry with multiple types

Kerkkamp

Heuvel

Wagelmans

2018

Omega

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We analyse a principal-agent contracting model with asymmetric information between a supplier and a retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer have the classical non-linear economic ordering cost functions consisting of ordering and holding costs. We assume that the retailer has the market power to enforce any order quantity. Furthermore, the retailer has private holding costs. The supplier wants to minimise his expected costs by offering a menu of contracts with side payments as an incentive mechanism. We consider a general number of discrete singledimensional retailer types with type-dependent default options.A natural and common model formulation is non-convex, but we present an equivalent convex formulation. Hence, the contracting model can be solved efficiently for a general number of retailer types. We also derive structural properties of the optimal menu of contracts. In particular, we completely characterise the optimum for two retailer types and provide a minimal list of candidate contracts for three types. Finally, we prove a sufficient condition to guarantee unique contracts in the optimal solution for a general number of retailer types.

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“…Most studies are focused on relatively micro supply chain systems and include multi-agent decision-making mechanisms. Issues include whether cooperation and coordination among the main actors in the supply chain system can affect the results of green innovation [7] and how this can be achieved using methods such as cost-sharing contracts, wholesale price premium contracts and revenue-sharing contracts, etc. [8,9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Consumer’s Green Preference and the Reference Price Effect Improve Green Innovation? A Theoretical Model Using the Food Supply Chain as a Case

Lei

2019

IJERPH

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Today, complex consumer purchase decisions affect company revolution, especially that dealing with environmental (green) innovation. Consumer preferences and pricing could interact in influencing green innovation. This situation is especially vital in industries that are characterized with many safety concerns that urge collaborative development between consumers and companies, such as the food industry. The aim of this paper is to explore the influence of the change in consumer preference characteristics on the green innovation efforts of the food supply chain, introducing the green preference of consumers and the reference price effect. A differential game model of green innovation in the food supply chain is constructed in this paper and solved. It was found that the change in consumer preference characteristics is an important factor to motivate supply chain members to make green innovation efforts. With the enhancement of consumer preference characteristics, the Pareto improvement effect of cost-sharing contracts on the profits of supply chain enterprises is clearer. Further, manufacturers can stimulate suppliers’ green innovation efforts through cost-sharing contracts. When the marginal profit ratio of food supply chain members reaches a certain threshold, the incentive effect of this cost-sharing contract is more significant, and it is more likely to realize the optimal profit of the food supply chain.

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Supply chain coordination under discrete information asymmetries and quantity discounts

Cited by 74 publications

References 39 publications

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Two-echelon supply chain coordination under information asymmetry with multiple types

Do Consumer’s Green Preference and the Reference Price Effect Improve Green Innovation? A Theoretical Model Using the Food Supply Chain as a Case

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