Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Han, Qunli; Wang, Yuyan

doi:10.3390/su10051686

Cited by 30 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Considering strategic customer behavior and green technology investment, Jiang et al [ 16 ] discussed optimal strategies for low carbon supply chain. Han et al [ 17 ] studied the optimal decisions in a low-carbon e-supply chain considering the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction behavior. Considering carbon concerned demand, Du et al [ 18 ] investigated performance and policies of low-carbon supply.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Zhang

2021

IJERPH

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Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Zhang

2021

IJERPH

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“…e manufacturer can sell its product through the traditional offline retail channel or online e-commerce platform channel. What is different from the offline mode is that the manufacturer has to pay some proportional sales revenue to the platform as the feedback for providing the sales channel in the online mode [37]. e ratio of the income for the platform in the whole sales revenue is called commission rate.…”

Section: Problem Description and Basic Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Offline and Online Channel Selection of Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Carbon Trading Market

Han

Yang

Zhang

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper investigates the low-carbon product manufacturer’s different decision behavior in the offline traditional retail channel and online e-commerce channel when the carbon trading market has been established. The low-carbon product manufacturer is both in the carbon trading market and product market. In the former market, the manufacturer can gain profits by selling its emission quota. In the latter market, the manufacturer has two sales channel options, the traditional offline retailer and the online e-commerce platform. These two channels make two supply chains, the manufacturer-led offline one and the e-commerce platform-led online one. This paper combines the carbon trading market with the product market, formulates different Stackelberg game models, compares the manufacturer’s decision under two channels and the impact of channels on the carbon emission, does sensitivity analysis, and verifies the conclusions with numerical examples. Our findings are (1) the establishment of the carbon market will help the manufacturer reduce its carbon emission, especially for those sensitive to the carbon price and those with too much emissions; (2) whether the manufacturer turns to the online channel depends on the consumers’ sensitivity to the sales service, and consumers’ attention will guide the way to the online mode; (3) which mode is conducive to carbon emission reduction relies on the product type: the e-commerce platform does well for daily necessities of mass production while the traditional channel is better for experience goods.

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“…Additionally, the authors of [41] assume that the green level of product and the advising effort of the retailer are measurable and quantifiable. In addition, Xue et al [56], Han and Wang [57], Wu [58], Xing et al [59] introduce similar variables to represent firms' emission reduction efforts in their researches. A large θ represents a higher green level; the higher the green level, the more investment in emission reduction during the production.…”

Section: Problem Notations and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

2020

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Under the threat of global warming, joint emission reduction strategy has been widely adopted as an effective solution for the industry to guarantee environmental sustainability. In the practice of supply chain, environmental regulations and supply chain contracts are applied with the attempt to improve environmental performance. However, whether these measures are actually effective remains unanswered. In this paper, we study a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer adopting joint emission reduction strategy. We first investigate under what circumstance the environmental regulation can effectively result in higher emission reduction efforts. The result shows that when the cost coefficient satisfies certain conditions, the increase of penalty or subsidy can lead to more investment in emission reduction. In addition, if the environmental impact caused by the production process is extremely high, the enforcement of the regulation is ineffective. We also explore how the cost-revenue-sharing contract affects the emission reduction strategy and the coordination of the members in the supply chain. The results suggest that the incentive effect of environmental regulation is more effective when the supply chain coordination contract exists. Numerical experiments are also presented to verify our analytical conclusions.

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Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Cited by 30 publications

References 49 publications

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Offline and Online Channel Selection of Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Carbon Trading Market

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

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