Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications

Evans, Robert G.

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-63660-0_10

Cited by 403 publications

(275 citation statements)

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“…The concept of induced demand is first attributed to Evans (1974). McGuire (2000) defines PID as: "when the physician influences a patient's demand for care against the physician's interpretation of the best interests of the patient" (McGuire 2000, 504).…”

Section: A Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth

Johnson

Rehavi

2016

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

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Section: A Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth

Johnson

Rehavi

2016

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

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“…Similarly, let µ C2 denote the critical value where illness severity is such that the consumer is indi¤erent between consulting a GP and being hospitalized. The First Order Conditions for optimal choices of µ C1 and µ C2 are given by (8) and (9) respectively:…”

Section: Fully Informed Patientsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize

Blomqvist

Léger

2005

Journal of Health Economics

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CIRANOLe CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Résumé / AbstractÀ l'aide d'un modèle théorique dans lequel patients et médecins doivent choisir la quantité de service à utiliser ainsi que celui, de l'omnipraticien ou du spécialiste oeuvrant à l'hôpital, qui fournira ces services, nous analysons différents mécanismes d'incitation agissant sur l'offre et la demande. Nous étudions essentiellement deux modes d'organisation : le système conventionnel de rémunération à l'acte et le système de gestion intégrée des soins avec une rémunération per capita; à la fois en présence et en l'absence d'asymétrie d'information. Nous obtenons comme résultat qu'à certaines conditions plausibles, l'optimum de second-rang auquel mène le système de gestion intégrée est supérieur à celui que donne le système conventionnel de rémunération à l'acte qui répercute une partie des coûts sur l'utilisateur. In a theoretical model, we analyze the effects of various kinds of demand-and supply-side incentives in the context of a model in which patients

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“…Seminal work in this area has focused on demand inducement, where financial incentives may increase the quantity of services recommended and delivered by physicians beyond the point at which the medical benefits of such services justify their costs (Evans, 1974;McGuire and Pauly, 1991;Labelle et al, 1994;Gruber and Owings, 1996). Prior work on referrals by physicians for office-versus hospital-based care has highlighted the effects of financial incentives on decisions regarding the utilization of resources for the care of acute conditions (Marinoso and Jelovac, 2003;Blomqvist and Léger, 2005;Bain and Morrisey, 2007;David and Helmchen, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physician division of labor and patient selection for outpatient procedures

David

Neuman

2011

Journal of Health Economics

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Little is known about the ability of incentives to influence decisions by physicians regarding choices of settings for care delivery. In the context of outpatient procedural care, the emergence of freestanding ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) as alternatives to hospital-based outpatient departments (HOPDs) creates a unique opportunity to study this question. We advance a model where physicians' division of labor between ASCs and HOPDs affects the medical complexity of patients treated in low-acuity settings (i.e. ASCs). Analyses of outpatient surgical procedure data show that physicians working exclusively in low-acuity settings (i.e. ASCs) treat patients of significantly higher medical complexity in these settings than do physicians who also practice in higher-acuity settings (i.e. HOPDs). This discrepancy shrinks with increasing procedural risk and with increasing distance between ASCs and acute care hospitals. AbstractLittle is known about the effect of incentives on physicians' choices of settings for medical procedures. We advance a model where physicians' division of labor between ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) and hospital-based outpatient departments (HOPDs) affects the medical complexity of patients treated in low-acuity settings (i.e. ASCs). Analyses of outpatient surgical procedure data show that physicians working exclusively in low-acuity settings (i.e. ASCs) treat patients of significantly higher medical complexity in these settings than do physicians who also practice in higher-acuity settings (i.e. HOPDs).This discrepancy shrinks with increasing procedural risk and with increasing distance between ASCs and acute care hospitals.

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Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications

Cited by 403 publications

References 0 publications

Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth

Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth

Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize

Physician division of labor and patient selection for outpatient procedures

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