Supervenience Physicalism, Emergentism, and the Polluted Supervenience Base

Morris, Kevin

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9497-5

Cited by 16 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Although one might think that this has the consequence that emergent properties 'pollute' the physical emergence base (see Howell 2009, 93;Morris 2014), one might equally argue that this is something that emergentists would be happy with. After all, the doctrine that some arrangements of physical particles have some of their causal powers in virtue of there being special kinds of laws that are not derivable from purely physical laws is something that an emergentist would subscribe to.…”

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confidence: 99%

Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence

Baysan

2018

Erkenn

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According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features (i.e., nomological necessitation and causal novelty) are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects of emergentism with this distinction in the background.

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Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence

Baysan

2018

Erkenn

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“…3 For a discussion of supervenience as minimal physicalism, see Kim (1998), 14-15. Jessica Wilson (2005 argues that supervenience alone is insufficient for physicalism, but see Bennett (2008), Howell (2009, and Morris (2014) for further discussion. Recently, Barbara Montero (2013) has argued that supervenience is not even necessary for physicalism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism

Sharpe

2015

Philosophia

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Compatibilists respond to the problem of causal exclusion for nonreductive physicalism by rejecting the exclusionist's ban on overdetermination. By the compatibilist's lights there are two forms of overdetermination, one that's problematic and another that is entirely benign. Furthermore, multiple causation by Btightly relatedĉ auses requires only the benign form of overdetermination. Call this the tight relation strategy for avoiding problematic forms of overdetermination. To justify the tight relation strategy, modal compatibilists appeal to a widely accepted counterfactual test. The argument of this paper is that the counterfactual test fails to legitimize the tight relation strategy as it fails to adequately distinguish between problematic and benign overdetermination. Contrary to modal compatibilists, modal dependence does not suffice for benignity. I conclude by arguing that adequately addressing overdetermination worries requires a much heavier metaphysical burden than modal compatibilists have typically recognized.

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Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories

Elgin

2020

Erkenn

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Supervenience Physicalism, Emergentism, and the Polluted Supervenience Base

Cited by 16 publications

References 32 publications

Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence

Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence

Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism

Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories

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