Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism

Abstract

Compatibilists respond to the problem of causal exclusion for nonreductive physicalism by rejecting the exclusionist's ban on overdetermination. By the compatibilist's lights there are two forms of overdetermination, one that's problematic and another that is entirely benign. Furthermore, multiple causation by Btightly relatedĉ auses requires only the benign form of overdetermination. Call this the tight relation strategy for avoiding problematic forms of overdetermination. To justify the tight relation strategy, modal compatibilists appeal to a widely accepted counterfactual test. The argument of this paper is that the counterfactual test fails to legitimize the tight relation strategy as it fails to adequately distinguish between problematic and benign overdetermination. Contrary to modal compatibilists, modal dependence does not suffice for benignity. I conclude by arguing that adequately addressing overdetermination worries requires a much heavier metaphysical burden than modal compatibilists have typically recognized.

The Timing Problem for Dualist Accounts of Mental Causation

“…The Timing Problem is similar in some respects to a problem that Melnyk (2003) and Sharpe (2015) raise for dualist accounts of mental-to-physical causation, which is that whenever a mental state M1 and a physical state P1 both cause a physical effect P2, some account must be given for why there happen to be two distinct laws converging on the same effect, one correlating M1 with P2 and another correlating P1 with P2. 18 Such systematic nomic convergence certainly cries out for explanation, but given the dualist's view that mental and physical facts are irreducible to one another, it's unclear what kind of explanation they can offer.…”

“…21 Sharpe (2015) likewise argues that responses to the Exclusion Argument (e.g. Bennett's (2003)) that seek to allay worries about overdetermination by positing a modal connection between the mental and physical causes of a given effect leave the problem that he and Melnyk (2003) raise for non-reductive accounts of mental-to-physical causation unaddressed.…”

“…Section 5 addresses the worry that the problem presupposes an overly simplistic view of causation. Section 6 then compares the problem to the Exclusion Argument and a related problem raised by Melnyk (2003) and Sharpe (2015).…”