Successful strategies in repeated minority games

Chmura, Thorsten; Pitz, Thomas

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2005.12.053

Cited by 29 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Chmura and Pitz [31] report on two experimental treatments that differ in the amount of information given to participants. The more information participants receive, the more often they stick to their choice in the next round.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis

Chmura

Güth²

2011

Games

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Abstract:We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player's behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis

Chmura

Güth²

2011

Games

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“…Interesting questionswhich have not been addressed in the experimental literature to date on the minority game (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007;Chmura and Pitz, 2006)-include whether behavior of experimental subjects converges to one of the Nash equilibria of the game, and which learning process best describes subjects' behavior. Experiments on the closely related market entry game have sometimes shown puzzling results (Ochs, 1990), with aggregate play being close to the Nash equilibrium prediction, but with individual play not in line with any Nash equilibrium.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Renault et al (2005) study repeated play in the game. Bottazzi and Devetag (2007) and Chmura and Pitz (2006) study the game experimentally. In addition, the game has been studied extensively in the physics literature; see Kets (2007) for a discussion on the relation between this literature and the literature in experimental economics and learning.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning: The Minority Game

Kets

Voorneveld

2007

SSRN Journal

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The minority game is a simple congestion game with two actions and an odd number of players. Players want to choose the action that is chosen by the minority of players. We characterize the set of equilibria of the game. As the set of equilibria is large, a natural question is which equilibrium will be selected by the players.Since the pure Nash equilibria of the game are not strict and lead to payoff asymmetry among players, intuitively one would predict that players play according to the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. However, we show that many standard learning processes do not predict convergence to that equilibrium, and that in fact these processes converge to distinct equilibria.JEL classification: C72, D83

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“…In (Cicirelli et al, 2007) MG is exploited for developing protocols controlling the coverage level in large wireless sensor networks. Applications related to predator/prey models and traffic scenarios can be found respectively in (Cicirelli et al, 2011) and (Bazzan et al, 2000) (Chmura and Pitz, 2006). The game has been the subject of extensive study (Challet et al, 2005) and the original model has been modified in various ways (Sysi-Aho, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Sociality Minority Game

Cicirelli¹,

Furfaro²,

Nigro³

et al. 2011

ECMS 2011 Proceedings Edited By: T. Burczynski, J. Kolodziej, A. Byrski, M. Carvalho

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The minority game (MG) is a simple yet effective binarydecision model which is well suited to study the collective emerging behaviour in a population of agents with bounded and inductive rationality when they have to compete, through adaptation, for scarce resources. The original formulation of the MG was inspired by the W.B. Arthur's El Farol Bar problem in which a fixed number of people have to independently decide each week whether to go to a bar having a limited capacity. A decision is only affected by information on the number of visitors who attended the bar in the past weeks. In its basic version, the MG does not contemplate communication among players and it supposes that information about the past game outcomes is publicly available. This paper proposes the Dynamic Sociality Minority Game (DSMG), an original variant of the classic MG where (i) information about the outcome of the previously played game step is assumed to be known only by the agents that really attended the bar the previous week and (ii) a dynamically established acquaintance relationship is introduced to propagate such information among non attendant players. Particular game settings are identified which make DSMG able to exhibits a better coordination level among players with respect to standard MG. Behavioral properties of the DSMG are thoroughly analyzed through an agent-based simulation of a simple road-traffic model.

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Successful strategies in repeated minority games

Cited by 29 publications

References 7 publications

The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis

The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis

Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning: The Minority Game

Dynamic Sociality Minority Game

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