Substance, Predication, and Unity in Aristotle

Self-knowledge in Aristotle

“…30 There is disagreement whether the Aristotelian forms of ordinary form-matter compounds are exclusively general, one form for each species -exactly one form of man for all men, for example -or whether his ontology (also) includes individual forms, numerically different but qualitatively the same, one for each different member of a single species -one form for Callias and another for Socrates, and so on. The first view is taken in Lewis (1991) and in Loux (1991); the second is put forward in Frede and Patzig (1988). 3~ The claim of sameness between the activity of seeing and the activity of being an object of sight is made explicitly for perception at F2, 425b26 ff; cf.…”

“…Aristotle is less explicit on the sameness of activities in the case of nous and its objects: for discussion, see Section III below. 32 Wedin (1986Wedin ( ), p. 174, (1989 For discussion, see Lewis (1991), Chapter 4. 34 Notice, however, that Aristotle is not apparently immune to other instances of the fallacy in the Anita.…”

“…Two arguments come to mind (versions of one or both arguments are due to sceptics in the audience in Los Angeles). (I) Suppose that my nous thinks two distinct objects at the same time, that is, that If now the variety of accidental sameness in question is transitive and symmetric (as it appears to be, see Lewis (1991), p. 107), it apparently follows that By the same properties of accidental sameness as before, it apparently follows that (x) N is accidentally the same as N'.…”

History of Substance in Philosophy

“…Despite the fact that he doesn't utilize the expressions universal and particular in Categories, it is evident that Aristotle would consider primary substances particulars and secondary substances as universals. For he lets us know that primary substances are "not said of a subject" (Lewis, 1991), though secondary substance, for example, man "is said of a subject, the individual man" (Lewis, 1991), and this complies with his meaning of "particular" as well as "universal". Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form.…”

Parts of Universals: An Essay on Aristotle's Categories

“…Ackrill 1963, Robert Heinaman 1981, Daniel Devereux 1992, Michael Wedin 1993, and Verity Harte 2010 Defenders of the view that non-substantial individuals are universals include G.E.L. Owen 1965, Michael Loux 1991, Frank Lewis 1991, Russell Dancy 1975, Mehmet Erginel 2004, and Phil Corkum 2009 J.L. Ackrill's reading of a crucial passage at 1a24-25, faces insuperable difficulties.…”