Substance, change and matter in the Analogies of Experience of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

Abstract

This article explains in ten points the concepts of substance, change and matter that appear in the transcendental Analytics of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as categories and schemes, as well as how they function in the Analogies of Experience. It aims to demonstrate how the category in general, and that of substance in particular, are, in their transcendental ideality, a strategy of the subject to order and objectify the phenomenal world. It establishes that change is also necessary a priori, that both change (accident) and persistence (substance), as well as all appearances, are finite and limited. This would lead to the affirmation that only matter, transcendental matter, is entirely persistent; however, transcendental matter is not a sensible object and therefore those sensible objects that relatively persist in time-space are the only empirical reality of the substance. Finally, matter is made up of forces, and given that there is nothing simple in matter, it can be inferred that empirical substance is nothing other than a field of forces.
 Recebido / Received: 14.6.2019.Aprovado / Approved: 1.8.2019.