Subjectivity and Objectivity in Analytic Listening

Abstract

Analysts use the concepts of subjectivity and intersubjectivity to support many different technical recommendations; this represents a misuse of theory. The dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity is a false one. Arguing against the notion of objectivity, analysts conflate it with the idealized notion of pure objectivity and then eliminate various technical devices in its name. One cannot have a concept of subjectivity without a concept of objectivity, or an intersubjective perspective that does not include some agreed-upon concept of objectivity. The simplest definition of objectivity is a directional one. Objectivity is the perception or experience of the external; subjectivity is the perception or experience of the internal. Subjectivity and objectivity are both necessary pathways to knowledge and are dependent on each other. Any form of looking or listening does to some extent preclude another, but to speak solely from a subjective or an objective perspective represents a regression in thinking to a form of naive objectivism or naive subjectivism. Clinical examples illustrate how the forming and testing of hypotheses require the cooperation of both subjective and objective listening.

What Do Patients Want?: Personal Disclosure and the Intersubjective Perspective

“…As others (Smith 1999) have noted, the origins of Freud's admonitions about anonymity were related to his concern for significant boundary violations that were occurring between patients and analysts, particularly sexual liaisons.…”

“…There have been any number of works emphasizing the import or experience of personal disclosure, such as Cole's (2001) work on the HIV infected analysts, or Goldstein's (1997) discussion about revealing one's sexual orientation. These latter works may reflect the personal perspective and way of working of these therapists (Smith 1999), and may not generalize to every therapist, or for that matter to every patient. Moreover, these disclosures may reflect a time in the life of a therapist, a perspective that changes with differing experiences (Ruderman 2002).…”

“…There is an appreciation by those from a classical tradition (Jacobs 1999;Smith 1999) that disclosure is part of the process. Such authors might hesitate to deliberately disclose personal thoughts or feelings, but they also recognized that disclosure of personal feelings or thoughts could happen unintentionally.…”

“…Most contemporary analysts, regardless of their theoretical bias, would consider the relationship and the analyst's participation in the therapeutic dyad as significant (Jacobs 1999;Smith 1999) rather than something separate from the therapeutic process. The therapist can no longer be considered an objective observer who does not impact the patient's mental processes.…”

What Constitutes Therapeutic Knowledge and How We Believe it is to Be Attained

“…It seems unlikely that psychoanalysts are capable of reaching a conclusion about a philosophical debate that has remained unresolved for centuries, to say nothing of whether it is possible to resolve a psychoanalytic question on philosophical grounds to begin with. Henry Smith's (1999) observation that "both the subjective and the objective components of perception are, in Renik's now familiar characterization, 'irreducible'" (p. 474) suggests that it might be better to leave philosophical questions to the philosophers and focus instead on what we know about the psychology of mind. Are there perceptual-cognitive differences that irreducibly distinguish the two epistemological positions, and if so, does each afford access to particular content that is not available to the other?…”