Subjective Reasons

Vogelstein, Eric

doi:10.1007/s10677-011-9286-7

Cited by 19 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…it does not count in favor of the response) has no actual weight, so we can say that it is disabled. 22 For accounts of rationality in terms of apparent reasons, see Schroeder (2007), Way (2009), Parfit (2011), Vogelstein (2012, Whiting (2014), and Sylvan (2015).…”

Section: Department Of Logic History and Philosophy Of Science Uned mentioning

confidence: 99%

No Reasons to Believe the False

Salas¹

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.

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Section: Department Of Logic History and Philosophy Of Science Uned mentioning

confidence: 99%

No Reasons to Believe the False

Salas¹

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…Alvarez 2010: 24;Hornsby 2008, § 1.2;Parfit 2011: 33-35;Schroeder 2007: 14-15;Vogelstein 2012;Way 2009: 3-4). 7 The proposal is not the dualist one that there are two utterly distinct kinds of reasons.…”

Section: Subjective Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Peter is not Superman, and there is no metaphysically possible world in which he is. 20 Since there is no world in which the facts are as they appear to Mary to be, it follows trivially from (C*) that Mary has 17 For various amendments, see Vogelstein (2012). 18 There are, of course, alternatives to the Lewisian account of subjunctives.…”

Section: The Problem With Counterfactual Analysesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keep Things in Perspective

Whiting

2017

JESP

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Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspective. After explaining and establishing this point, I offer a novel account of subjective reasons that avoids the problem.

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“… Sinnott‐Armstrong (). Among others who have found this view attractive are Oppenheim (), Vallentyne (), Saka (), Littlejohn (), Vogelstein (). …”

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confidence: 99%

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

King

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. ‘Ought’ and ‘can’ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of ‘ought implies can’. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice.

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Subjective Reasons

Cited by 19 publications

References 13 publications

No Reasons to Believe the False

No Reasons to Believe the False

Keep Things in Perspective

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

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