Subglobal climate-change actions and carbon leakage: the implication of international capital flows

Babiker, Mustafa

doi:10.1016/s0140-9883(00)00065-7

Cited by 33 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Several papers have examined the potential empirical magnitude of leakage when GHG abatement actions in the energy sector (e.g., emissions limits, carbon taxes, or tradable permits) are applicable to only a subset of the world's countries (e.g., Oliveira-Martins et al 1992;Felder and Rutherford 1993;Manne and Rutherford 1994;Jacoby et al 1997;Smith 1998;Bernstein et al 1999;Barker 1999;Babiker 2001). These leakage estimates range from negligible (Barker 1999) to substantial (Felder and Rutherford 1993) but typically are in the range of 5 to 20 percent of targeted country emission reductions (IPCC 2001).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Estimating Leakage from Forest Carbon Sequestration Programs

Murray¹,

McCarl²,

Lee³

2004

Land Economics

223

131

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Estimating Leakage from Forest Carbon Sequestration Programs

Murray¹,

McCarl²,

Lee³

2004

Land Economics

223

131

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Therefore, we have calibrated the CES production function to a specific baseline point (Klump and Saam, 2008). As standard value, we choose σ 1 = 0.5, which is in line with the literature on CGE models (see for example Burniaux et al, 1992;Babiker, 2001;Burniaux and Truong, 2002;Paltsev et al, 2005;Edenhofer et al, 2010).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even If They Do Not Take Climate Change into Account

Franks

Edenhofer

Lessmann

2015

Environ Resource Econ

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Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: Finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition and resource extraction to assess the fiscal incentive of imposing a tax on carbon rather than on capital. We explicitly model international capital and resource markets, as well as intertemporal capital accumulation and resource extraction. While fossil resources give rise to scarcity rents, capital does not. With carbon taxes the rents can be captured and invested in infrastructure, which leads to higher welfare than under capital taxation. This result holds even without modeling environmental damages. It is robust under a variation of the behavioral assumptions of resource importers to coordinate their actions, and a resource exporter's ability to counteract carbon policies. Further, no green paradox occurs -instead, the carbon tax constitutes a viable green policy, since it postpones extraction and reduces cumulative emissions.JEL Classification: F21, H21, H30, H73, Q38

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“…synonymously with "rebound". Other areas of research address similar issues referred to sometimes as "(carbon) leakage", notably in the context of climate mitigation policy where relocation of "dirty industries" (often to developing countries with less stringent environmental regulation) and associated changes in foreign trade flows cause initial, direct reductions in GHG emissions to be compensated by increases in GHG emissions elsewhere (Felder and Rutherford 1993;Babiker 2001;Paltsev 2001;Kuik and Gerlagh 2003). Eichner and Pethig (2009) refer to the "green paradox", meaning that policies aimed at curbing GHG emissions may aggravate rather than alleviate global warming.…”

Section: Definitions and Interpretations Of Energy And Environmental mentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Conservation More Effective With Rebound Policy

Bergh

2010

Environ Resource Econ

226

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This article sketches the problem of indirect energy use effects, also known as rebound, of energy conservation. There is widespread support for energy conservation, especially when it is voluntary, as this seems a cheap way to realize environmental and energy-climate goals. However, this overlooks the phenomenon of rebound. The topic of energy rebound has mainly attracted attention from energy analysts, but has been surprisingly neglected in environmental economics, even though economists generally are concerned with indirect or economy-wide impacts of technical change and policies. This paper presents definitions and interpretations of energy and environmental rebound, as well as four fundamental reasons for the existence of the rebound phenomenon. It further offers the most complete list of rebound pathways or mechanisms available in the literature. In addition, it discusses empirical estimates of rebound and addresses the implications of uncertainties and difficulties in assessing rebound. Suggestions are offered for strategies and public policies to contain rebound. It is advised that rebound evaluation is an essential part of environmental policy and project assessments. As opposed to earlier studies, this paper stresses the relevance of the distinction between energy conservation resulting from autonomous demand

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Subglobal climate-change actions and carbon leakage: the implication of international capital flows

Cited by 33 publications

References 4 publications

Estimating Leakage from Forest Carbon Sequestration Programs

Estimating Leakage from Forest Carbon Sequestration Programs

Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even If They Do Not Take Climate Change into Account

Energy Conservation More Effective With Rebound Policy

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