Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories

Abstract

Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) highlight the independence between distinct metamemorial judgments that contribute to the experience of remembering. Initial definitions of NBMs portrayed them as involving the withdrawal of belief in occurrence despite sustained recollection. While people rate belief for their NBMs as weaker than recollection, the average difference is too small to support the idea that autobiographical belief is completely withdrawn in all cases. Furthermore, autobiographical belief and recollection ratings vary considerably across NBMs. In two studies, we reanalyzed data from prior studies to examine whether NBM reports reflect a single category or multiple sub-categories using cluster analytic methods. In Study 1, we identified three sub-types of NBMs. In Study 2 we incorporated the concept of belief in accuracy, and found that two of the clusters from Study 1 split into two clusters apiece. All clusters were characterized by higher recollection than belief in occurrence ratings, and clusters were differentiated by the degree of difference between these variables. In both studies the clusters were discriminated by a number of memory characteristic ratings and by reasons reported as leading to the alteration of belief. Implications for understanding the remembering of past events and predicting the creation of NBMs are discussed.Keywords: nonbelieved memory, subtype, cluster analysis, belief in occurrence, accuracy, memory SUB-TYPES OF NONBELIEVED MEMORIES… 3 Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) have been described as a counterintuitive phenomenon in which a person claims to have a vivid episodic recollection of an event, despite no longer believing that the event is veridical. Anecdotal reports of NBMs have been known for some time, but this type of memorial experience has only recently become a topic of scientific study, and recognized as more common than previously thought (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; see Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014, for a review). The purpose of this paper is to revisit the quality of fit between people's reports and ratings of naturally-occurring NBMs and theoretical characterizations of these memories. To this end, we examine the possibility that differentiating sub-types of NBMs might better elucidate the circumstances in which people's appraisals of belief in occurrence and recollection about remembered events are revised.Researchers interested in NBMs have found them relatively easy to observe in everyday experience, and easy to create artificially in the laboratory. As a consequence, several studies have been conducted that collectively reveal some typical characteristics of NBMs. First, when people report having ceased believing a memory, this belief-change frequently follows the receipt of some form of social feedback (in about half of reports; Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015). Individuals also report altering belief due to reappraisal of the plausibility of event...

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

“…However, it is premature to try to explain why for some individuals the effect of these and similar social factors is strong, and for others they have less, if any, influence. Measuring directly perceptions of credibility of the experimenter and the feedback itself, as well as individual characteristics, might provide additional important information about the impact of social feedback on belief and The NBM subtypes are taken from Scoboria, Nash, and Mazzoni (2017) recollection judgments. Future studies could use manipulations of social variables such as credibility, social pressure, and so forth, to explore additional effects of memorial feedback on belief in occurrence and recollection, along with different cognitive/social/personality characteristics.…”

“…There were a notable number of instances in which recollection ratings were higher than belief in the occurrence ratings for challenged performed actions in Study 2. Hence, we examined whether NBMs resulted for some challenged actions, and explored whether the NBMs fit into the three subtypes discussed by Scoboria et al (2017). To be categorized as an NBM, the Time 2 belief score had to be one or more points lower than the Time 2 recollection score; this criterion was met for 72 performed challenged actions and 10 performed control actions.…”

“…Disconfirmatory social feedback was the most frequently reported reason across a number of studies. Subsequent work on spontaneous NBMs has shown that the degree to which belief in occurrence is affected when memories for events are challenged can vary substantially (Scoboria, Nash, & Mazzoni, 2017).…”

“…This limits the ability to confidently estimate the degree to which challenges influenced other variables, and also to ascertain the existence of individual differences in the propensity to defend or relinquish belief. Second, the yes/no response emphasized a dichotomy of defense versus relinquishment of belief, disregarding the possibility to assess the gradient in change (from slight reduction to complete relinquishment of belief) that has been observed in previous studies (e.g., Scoboria et al, 2017). Belief in occurrence is frequently assessed using a continuous scale (Scoboria et al, 2014), which provides a richer pattern of responses.…”

On the role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in the future occurrence of imagined events

“…While belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy represent distinct metacognitive attributions, which are conceptually and empirically distinguishable (Ernst & D'Argembeau, 2017;Scoboria et al, 2015Scoboria et al, , 2017Scoboria, Mazzoni, Ernst & D'Argembeau, in press), they frequently co-occur and may act in concert to create the subjective experience of mentally visiting one's personal future (see Scoboria et al, 2014Scoboria et al, , 2015 for similar results regarding memories for past events).…”