Strengths and shortcomings of habitat exchange programs for species conservation

Abstract

Habitat exchange programs, a form of biodiversity offsetting, aim to compensate for negative impacts in one area by conservation in another. A newer subset of habitat exchange programs includes programs that have three distinct characteristics: they allow for temporary (as opposed to only permanent) credits; they are centralized and overseen by nonregulatory, independent administrators; and they exist in the absence of mandatory mitigation policy. As a result, these programs may be relatively flexible and practical in areas where environmental regulation is unpalatable politically. We synthesized gray and peer‐reviewed literature to evaluate these programs’ strengths and shortcomings. On the basis of our synthesis, we suggest that temporary conservation credits in habitat exchanges could encourage participation of landowners in conservation and enable programs to respond to environmental change. However, temporary credits can lead to trade‐offs between flexibility and uncertainty. Moreover, there is little evidence that these habitat exchange programs have benefited target species, and many challenges associated with offsetting programs persist. Newer forms of habitat exchange programs may have potential to achieve no net loss or net gains of biodiversity to a greater extent than other forms of offsetting, but this potential has not yet been realized.

Habitat leasing as an alternative to affirmative conservation easements in conserving wildlife on private lands

“…The lease agreement further requires the landowner to treat invasive cheatgrass, manage encroaching conifers, and participate in controlled burns as appropriate to improve the elk habitat (PERC 2022). Habitat exchange programs, like the Recovery Credit System developed to mitigate impacts to the federally endangered golden-cheeked warbler, provide other examples of term-limited, private land conservation programs for species in regulatory contexts (Wolfe et al 2012, Davis et al 2022. These types of agreements are still emerging as viable short-term conservation options but could achieve the goals Brown et al (2023) sought with affirmative clauses, while providing substantially more room for innovation and flexibility.…”

Regulation, the hybrid market, and species conservation: The case of conservation banking in California

“…Rare competitors are HCEs under ESA. In these hybrid markets, multiple landowners generate credits and a central clearinghouse organizes this diffuse (sometimes temporary) credit production and the sales (Galik et al 2017;Davis et al 2021). HCEs are mainly in pilot stages at this point and may exist in areas with no mandatory mitigation policy (ibid.).…”