Strengthened equilibria for conflict problems

Smol’yakov, E. R.

doi:10.1134/s1064562407040205

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Cited by 5 publications

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“…Hence, basic equilibria are constructed on the basis of definitions (1)- (7) in the same way as Definition 1a is formed from Definition 1. We note that a further extension of the basic system of equilibria [1] is obtained in [5][6][7][8].…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An approach to solution uniqueness in game problems

Smol’yakov

2009

Cybern Syst Anal

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A new concept of strong conflict equilibrium is proposed that supplements the well-known fundamental system of conflict equilibria and considerably increases the possibility of finding a unique strongest equilibrium (solution) in any game problem. The efficiency of this new equilibrium is illustrated by static and dynamic game problems.Keywords: conflict equilibrium, games and the solution uniqueness problem. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND A BASIC SYSTEM OF EQUILIBRIAWe formulate some equilibria from the basic system [1] in a general form. Without them, it is impossible to understand the meaning and role of the proposed new concept of ¢ D -equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to the following assumption.263 1 This work was carried out under the program "Basic foundations of information technologies and systems" of the Russian Academy of Science (Project No. 1-3).

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