An approach to solution uniqueness in game problems

Abstract

A new concept of strong conflict equilibrium is proposed that supplements the well-known fundamental system of conflict equilibria and considerably increases the possibility of finding a unique strongest equilibrium (solution) in any game problem. The efficiency of this new equilibrium is illustrated by static and dynamic game problems.Keywords: conflict equilibrium, games and the solution uniqueness problem. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND A BASIC SYSTEM OF EQUILIBRIAWe formulate some equilibria from the basic system [1] in a general form. Without them, it is impossible to understand the meaning and role of the proposed new concept of ¢ D -equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to the following assumption.263 1 This work was carried out under the program "Basic foundations of information technologies and systems" of the Russian Academy of Science (Project No. 1-3).